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I . INTRODUCTION
A little over three years have now passed since
President Mubarak of Egypt had assumed power. His prede-
cessor, the late President Sadat, had forged a close relation-
ship with the United States shifting Egypt's superpower
orientation from the east to the west. We shall examine
whether Mubarak has maintained Sadat's foreign policy ob-
jectives and the means to achieve them or not. There has
been much said in Moscow, Washington, and other capitals
about Mubarak being a Sadat clone, or a Nasser-type. Some
have said Egypt has turned 180-degrees under Mubarak, while
others called him a traitor to the Arab cause. Even the
average Egyptian on the streets of Cairo cannot tell you if
Mubarak has changed or continued his predecessors foreign
policy. Like the rest of the world, many Egyptians fall
back on recent history and the two previous presidents —
Nasser and Sadat. Mubarak is compared with the two late
leaders and understandably one cannot neatly categorize him.
Again, recent Egyptian history gave the world charismatic
leaders; while the international setting provided each
leader with a chance to literally perform miracles on the
world stage.
It is important to keep in mind when reading this study,
that it was designed to reflect the views of a Third World
state as it probes its environment, wishing to control and
manipulate as many of the variables as possible which impact
on the formulation of its foreign policy. To maximize in-
fluence while minimizing the cost or effort. The need to
understand at least how some of these key Third World
countries formulate their external behavior in the world
does exist. The types of pressures on the Egyptian leader-
ship differ greatly from those affecting Washington or
Paris. Overpopulation, limited resources, a significant
illiteracy rate, and deeply-rooted religious consciousness
combined with a strategic location complicate the delicate
balance needed to survive by any Egyptian regime in the
volatile Middle East. At times the leadership becomes
caught in its own vituperation with subsequent catastrophic
results or it realizes the state's inherent dependence on
external resources to perform its perceived role and be-
comes disillusioned. As we explore the question of continui-
ty or change we will also need to look at these contradictory
pressures on the Egyptian leadership.
We will attempt to remove the confusion that has been
circulating for a period now, and answer the question of
continuity or change. This study will be divided into
several parts. Chapter 2 will cover the framework for
analysis used in the study. "Role conception" -- the regime's
strategy, general orientation and perceptions of reality, will
be introduced in Chapter 3 and brought in at various parts
when necessary. In Chapter 4 we will cover Egyptian
politico-diplomatic relations with the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the nonaligned world. Egyptian military
and economic relations will involve Chapters 6 and 7 . There-
fore, "role enactment" of the current regime will be dis-
cussed in Chapters 4-7. Each of these chapters will not
be mutually exclusive. The issues of the day cut across
the above artificial divisions . These were only designed as
an analytical tool to better study the data and events.
There will not be any elaborate presentation of Egypt's
economy, history, or its social make-up. These have been
well covered elsewhere and would be repetitive in nature.*
Relevant issues from these subjects will be brought forward
in as far as they impact on this study. In the conclusion
we will tie together the elements presented in the body. We
will engage ourselves in the luxury of offering probable
courses of actions by the current Egyptian regime in light
of the results of our study.
Sources used were predominantly in Arabic, mostly but
not all were Egyptian sources. These included books, news-
paper and magazine accounts of interviews with key decision-
makers. In addition the author was afforded the opportunity
*See Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat , Prince-
ton University Press, 1983; Aliboni, R. , and others, Egypt 's
Economic Potential, Croom Helm, 1984; and, Ajami, F., The
Arab Predicament, pp. 77-136, Cambridge University Press,
1981.
to conduct in-country research at Al-Ahram Center of Strategic
Studies and was grateful for discussing some of his ideas
with academics, political appointees, and members of the
Egyptian elite.
II . A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The Third World has presented a challenge to those
analyzing the foreign policies of its developing states
[Ref. 1] . Three major approaches had dominated the study
of foreign policy:
(1) Relating a country's foreign policy to the personality
of a single leader. This approach advocated the study
of the kings and presidents to understand the source
of foreign policy. The leader's whims decide the fate
of the state.
(2) The "grand theory" or the great powers approach as
advocated by Morgenthau in his classic treatise
Politics Among Nations . This approach views foreign
policy as a function of east-west conflict. The
developing countries lack autonomy in foreign policy
formulation. They are always reacting to external
situations not of their own doing.
(3) The Reductionist or model-building approach [Ref. 2]
does not differentiate between developed and develop-
ing countries regarding their foreign policy process
.
Some underlying assumptions include that the behavior
of all actors follows a rational actor model of
decision-making, that they are powerenhancers , and are
motivated by security factors
.
While the above approaches have some utility value in the
developing world, they have not been without some serious
drawbacks. The main weaknesses of the first two approaches
is their neglect of the domestic context in decision-making.
The psychologistic approach totally neglects context, while
rendering foreign policy to an erratic , and irrational
activity. The great powers approach effectively negates any
developing nation the ability of an independent foreign policy
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The third approach has more explanatory power but does not
account, for specific features sui generis such as moderniza-
tion, low level or inexistent institutionalization and de-
pendency status in the global stratification system.
A new body of literature emerged in the 1970s with em-
phasis on domestic sources of foreign policy and linking
modernization and social change to the nation's foreign
policy. Additional emphasis was also placed on the actor's
economic position in the global hierarchy. Dessouki and
Korany label this new body of literature "the foreign policy
of development" [Ref. 3:p. 7]. They suggest that a proper
analysis of the foreign policies of Third World countries
"Cannot be separated from the domestic social structure or
domestic political process... we have to open the 'black box 1 .
And regarding the global environment "...a Third World
society can be permeated, penetrated, and even "dominated
.
It is thus important to see how external constraints and
global structures .. .affect its foreign policy-making process
as well as its international behavior." [Ref. 3:p. 8]
Dessouki and Korany advance three major issues faced by
developing countries in the conduct of their foreign policies
[Ref. 3:p. 8]. The first is the aid/independence dilemma
where the trade-off is between the need for foreign aid and
the maintenance of national independence.
The second issue is the resources/objectives dilemma.
This is a problem when the developing country formulates
11
diplomatic and military objectives clearly beyond its indige-
nous resource base. A country's activist policies and "his-
torical" legacy can quickly exhaust its resources and
capabilities
.
The third issue advanced is the security/development
dilemma -- the guns or butter debate. Sadat's overtures to
the United States were at least partly motivated by his
country's economic woes. While Syria today is neglecting
development vis-a-vis its obvious security needs
.
These dilemmas or issue areas have to be tackled by the
Egyptian regime under Mubarak, just as Sadat had done for
over a decade. But has Mubarak's choices deviated from his
predecessors? If so, why? Do they both conceptualize
reality in similar terms? Has their personalities effected
the decision-making process? Also, has there been any ob-
jective changes to the environment (domestic, regional, and
global) within which major decisions were made?
The conceptual framework of this study will revolve
around Egypt's foreign policy outputs using the concepts of
general orientation and national role-conception [Ref. 4].
K. J. Holsti defines orientation as "...a state's general
attitudes and commitments toward the external environment
and its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its domestic
and external objectives and for coping with persisting
threats." [Ref. 4: p. 98] Moving from the broad and general
concept of orientation we then deal with the national
12
role-conception which Holsti defines as "...the policy maker's
definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments,
rules, and actions suitable to their state and of the func-
tions their state should perform in a variety of geographic
and issue settings." {Ref. 4:p. 116] Dessouki and Korany
have combined both general orientation and national role to
a category of "role conception", while categorizing "role
performance" or "role enactment" to the specific foreign
policy behavior [Ref. 3:p. 12]. Therfore, foreign policy
output is disaggregated to its relevant components, the "say"
and "do" of the government.
In this study we will attempt then to establish Egypt's
foreign policy orientation, general objectives and strategy
— "role conception." This will be basically achieved by
looking at the public declarations of Egypt's leaders, past
and present, in addition to key officials involved in the
foreign policy decision-making process. These could be in
forms of published works, speeches, interviews, or joint
statements with foreign dignitaries. We will observe that
some of the elements making up the "role conception" have
been constant with the variation being each regime's per-
ceptions of its environment, and the ways to deal with it.
We should then not be too surprised if "role conception" in
Egypt has been more constant than not in recent history.
Regarding specific foreign policy behavior or "role
enactment" we will be examining the "do's" of the present
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leadership. How did they act on political, military and
economic issues which provide them the opportunity to
exercise their "role conception." Are they saying one thing
and doing another? If so, then why? Was there a gap in
Sadat's Egypt between the "say" and "do" of his regime?
Again we need to compare Mubarak's actions with his pre-
decessor in relation to their "role conception" and the con-
text of their decisions if we expect to answer the continuity
or change question.
Once that is answered, we need to ask ourselves why?
What causes one leader to deviate or continue on prior poli-
cies. Obviously, perceptions may change by the change of
leadership but their external expression will remain con-
strained by environmental structures unless an effort is
made to change them. The domestic context in Egypt has played
an important role as a constraint on available presidential
choices on foreign policy. The economic dilemma passed to
Mubarak still exists as it had under Sadat. The population
continues to increase, but local agricultural production is
not maintaining pace. So to complete the analytical picture
we must look inside the 'black box', to look at the domestic
environment providing the immediate and most vital decisional
context.* But we should not downplay the importance of
*Any regime must first survive in order to carry out its
policies. It does the leader no good to make decisions
favorable to international organizations if they may cause
his demise at home.
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existing systemic structures which interact with national
capabilities and dispositions to determine the direction
and scope of a country's foreign policy.
15
III. ROLE CONCEPTION
"The pages of history are full of heroes who created
for themselves roles of glorious valor which they
played at decisive moments. Likewise the pages of
history are also full of heroic and glorious roles
which never found heroes to perform them. For some
reason it seems to me that within the Arab circle
there is a role, wandering aimlessly in search of a
heroe...[it] has at last settled down... near the
borders of our country and is beckoning to us to
move, to take up its lines, to put on its costume,
since no one else is qualified to play it." [Ref. 1]
"Egypt, for several centuries, has been performing
an important function of cultural and political
synthesis between Islan and Christianity, the Arab
world and Europe, Africa and Asis, and civilization
of the desert and that of the Mediterranean. This
reality, together with the perennial character of
the citizens of the oldest state in the area, ac-
quired through the ages, constitutes an important
factor that conditions the attitudes and behavior
of Egypt toward the rest of the world." [Ref. 2]
Egypt's geography places it astride two continents, link-
ing the Arab east (Machreq) and the Arab west (Maghreb) , Asia
and Africa. It is part and parcel of the African continent,
the Moslem world, the developing Third World, and the
Mediterranean world. It was ruled by Persians, Romans, Turks,
and Arabs for milleniums. They all left their imprint on the
Egyptian culture with the Arab-Islamic heritage dominating
since the seventh century.
The Nile river is another constant in Egypt's geography,
for thousands of years it has linked Egypt with the heart of
Africa. Mohamed Ali's sons, Ismail Pasha and Ibrahim Pasha,
retraced the steps of the Pharaoes and between 1822 and 1840
were able to bring all Sudanese provinces under Egyptian
16
control- Unification of the Nile valley under Egyptian rule
was deemed necessary for security and economic reasons.
Today this continues with emphasis on unification and less
on rule by the Egyptian leadership. Heikal [Ref. 3], once
considered the most influential journalist in the Middle East,
in a 1978 article evaluates Egyptian vitality by the direction
of its foreign policy, whether its dealing on its eastern flank
or its sourthern border: "The more outgoing and vigorous it
is, the more active its policy toward the east; the more in-
trospective and turned in on itself it becomes, the more it
looks southward." [Ref. 3: p. 717] He additionally delineates
a struggle between the "Middle Eastern system" advocated by
the West to counter the threat of communism and the "Arab
system" advocated by Nasser and Arab nationalists who did not
see their region as an extension of the struggle in Europe
between the superpowers
.
These geographical, cultural, and historical constants
paly a major role in shaping the options available to any
Egyptian ruler and go beyond any personal idiosyncratic
approach in explaining Egypt's orientation. As Boutros-Ghali
wrote in 1963:
"the unique geopolitical position of the U .A .R. ... imposes
on her a dynamic foreign policy which compels her to
squarely meet a new challenge: how to discharge today the
obligations of her unique geopolitical and historical posi-
tion with the power and means at her disposal." [Ref. 4]
Nasser, inaugurated in 1955 the concept of the three
circles (Arab, African, and Islamic) in which he envisioned
Egypt providing the leadership role. To that was added the
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circle of nonalignment or neutralist policy crystallizing
after the Bandung and Brioni conferences of 1955-56. Non-
alignment became a major foundation in Egyptian foreign
policy
:
".... Neutralism has emerged as a new ideology ... in the
field of foreign relations, [it] is incompatible with any
pro-Western Mediterranean policy ... likewise it is incom-
patible with any particular designs that the Soviet Union
might have on the Middle East." [Ref. 4:p. 347]
Egypt's leadership role in the region was crystallizing
from the mid-1940s onwards following its relative isolation
from its eastern neighbors earlier in the century. Nasser in
order to maximize Egypt's prestige and influence in the region
and the world sought to remove Egypt and the Arab world from
the spheres of influence of the superpowers, and attempted to
develop cooperation in the region to increase its self-worth
[Ref. 5], By so doing he would render Egypt the dominant
power in the Arab world and to bring some semblence of dig-
nity following the 1948 Arab defeat at the hands of Israel.
Boutros-Ghali writing over twenty years ago on Egypt's foreign
policy orientation, states that in:
"...the African, the Arabic, the Muslim, and the neutralist
[circles] -- Egypt may hope to enjoy a role of leadership.
On the contrary, in any pro-Western policy, Egypt always
played the role of a vassal state." [Ref. 4:p. 334]
This basic orientation of Egyptian foreign policy has
conferred may bonuses on the country but not without some
problems. One needs only to remember John Foster Dulles and
his depiction of nonalighment and neutralist policies
"immoral" as he strove to develop an anti-communist Middle
East/Northern Tier bloc. K. J. Holsti describes nonalign-
ment orientation,
"...as a means of obtaining maximum economic concessions
from both blocs, recognizing that to make permanent mili-
tary arrangements with one bloc would close off the other
as a possible source of supply, markets, and foreign aid....
To be nonaligned is to maximize opportunities to meet
domestic economic needs, while minimizing dependencies."
[Ref. 6]
This policy has additional attraction since it has often been
couched in anti-Western terms reflecting the abundant anti-
colonial feelings in the 1950s and 1960s. An easy means to
gain political domestic support would be to pronounce neutral-
ist policies and denounce Western imperialism.
The end of the tumultous decade of the 1960s brought a
new breed of leaders in an altered environment. The days of
the Nassers, Nehrus, Sukarnos , and Nkrumahs were coming to a
close as was the wave of entries of newly independent states
.
Economic development and modernization became the occupation
of these new governments. Now that many had celebrated their
independence and undergone the agonies of consolidating their
power over, more often than not, a diverse ethnic peoples
within arbitrary political borders, they looked at economic
— and more precisely industrial -- development as the fruit
and symbol of independence. Egypt's historical past and ex-
perience [Ref. 7] had been different and was spared many of
the social agonies of newly emerging states. However, the
desire to gain independence from its colonial power had been
the thread of similarity with other African states.
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Anwar El-Sadat in October 1970 was elected president of
Egypt following Nasser's death. He was facing mounting eco-
nomic problems, a military stalemate with Israel over Sinai
since 1967, in conjunction with a general lack of popular
confidence in the government and the military.* Sadat reit-
erated his predecessor's legacy "Freedom, Socialism, and Unity,"
for he was in Nasser's shadows. His legitimacy was tied
directly to Nasser and the July Revolution. He had been a
member of the Free Officers involved in the 1952 coup, and
had survived all the internal jockeying for power within
Nasser's circle to find himself the Vice-president at the
time of Nasser's death.
The year 1971 was momentous for Sadat [Ref . 8] . He had
dubbed it the "Year of decision" with regards to liberating
the Sinai. It also witnessed his consolidation of power over
the Ali Sabri group in May. This was subsequently called the
"Second Revolution" or more popularly "The Corrective Revolu-
tion." Interestingly , the dean of Egyptian letters Tawfig
Al-Hakim [Ref. 9] in a book published in 1974 but written in
1972 -- before the October War, he attacks the Nasser years.
The whole Nasser experience becomes a moment of madness where
empty victories were sought and pan-Arab dreams remain just
that -- costly dreams, argues Tawfig Al-Hakim.
*The eminent Egyptian writer Naguib Mahfouz reflects the
mood of the country between 1967-1973 in the novels: Al-Maraya ,
Cairo, 1972; Al-Hub Taht Al-Matar , Cairo, 1973; and Al-Karnak ,
Cairo, 1974.
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The October War gave Sadat the opportunity to right a
wrong (the 1967 defeat), regain Egyptian dignity, and vastly
increase the scope of his political and diplomatic maneuvera-
bility. This limited victory would enable him to embark on
his own initiatives — domestically and regionally without
being overly concerned with is predecessor's legacy. He was
now willing to and capable of making the difficult decisions
which may go against established Arab and Egyptian political
tradition and norms. In the spring of 1974, he embarked on
the open door policy -- opening Egypt economically to western
technology, Arab capital -- to tap Egypt's abundant resources
[Ref. 10]. By a single stroke, Sadat hoped to remove the
Arab socialism of Nasser and introduce his economic liberali-
zation policy designed to lift Egypt from its economic quagmire
His assessment of the present international economic system
and local economic conditions on the one hand and Egypt's
attempts and failures since 1952 to attract capital (Egyptian
and otherwise) brought him to the aforementioned policy
decision
.
In conjunction with domestic economic reforms, Sadat was
preparing to align himself* with the United States, while in-
creasing his distance from the Soviet Union whom he later
described as "crude and tasteless people." [Ref. 11] Ali E.
*For Sadat there was no difference between himself and the
State, they are one and the same. The army was 'My' army,
•My 1 sons and daughters were the Egyptian youth.
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Hillal Dessouki [Ref. 12], a well respected academic at
Cairo University presents Sadat's foreign policy objectives
to include:
(1) The termination of the war with Israel, as the economic
costs had become unbearable.
(2) The improvement of relations with Washington, as the
United States was the only country that could influence
Israel
.
(3) The rejuvenation and modernization of the economy
through the import of modern western technology and
private capital.
(4) The modification of Egypt's global and regional poli-
cies in order to better pursue these objectives.
Sadat's Egypt would lead the Arab world just at Nasser's
Egypt had but this time toward peace and prosperity for all;
or so Sadat had hoped. Both men believed that Egypt's great-
ness was due to its Arab affiliation combined with a region-
ally active foreign policy [Ref. 13], while Sadat saw it as
"a structural property, not a behavioral attribute, as a
property that could not be challenged or taken away. Conse-
quently, he did not feel the need to pursue an activist Arab
policy to maintain this leadership." [Ref. 12: p. 130]
Dessouki 's criticism of Sadat maybe a bit harsh since Sadat
truly believed that he can achieve with peace a comprehensive
solution to the Palestinian problem at Egypt's help and with
American participation. Egypt would continue its political
leadership and would demonstrate to the nouveau-riches of
the Peninsula that petro-dollars are not sufficient to de-throne
Egypt.
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Regarding Egypt's role in the region, Sadat in 1975
assures us:
"This is Egypt's fate, since time immemorial she has been
and continues to be the greatest Arab country, the most
influential and active in the region due to her heritage,
culture, and geo-strategic location .. .did you not see
how when Egypt's army emerged victorious in Sinai in
October that all the Arabs felt it was their victory."
[Ref. 14]
Three years later at a conference of the American Universities
in Cairo, he reiterated:
"Egypt has had an historical role in the region and the
Arab world for seven thousand years and Egypt has carried
out her leadership role with mastery. Most of the Arab
states remain small but Egypt is the oldest nation in the
world... and in the 19th century our communication with
Europe began before the establishment of most of the local
states... and for these political, geo-political, historical,
and geographical reasons Egypt has a specific role in the
region, and of course all have acknowledged it." [Ref. 15]
During Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem in 1977 he was
interviewed by Barbara Walters and in reply to a question on
Egypt's leadership role in the Arab World, he said "This is
a fact. War or peace is decided in Egypt, because as I told
you, we are forty million." [Ref. 16] On another occasion
Sadat expressed his belief that the Arab world would fall in
line behind Egypt. This was reflected in a reply to a ques-
tion by then Israel's minister of defense Ezer Weizman:
"The Jordanians will follow in our footsteps. So will the
Syrians. Things in the Arab world happen the way Egypt
decides." [Ref. 17]
To Egypt's west, Qadhafi continued to urge unity with
Egypt. His near fanatical desire to unite the two countries
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stem not only from his ideological commitment to Arah unity,
hut also from his belief that Egypt's capabilities will give
him claim to leadership of the Arab world. This would ex-
plain his often quoted assertion that whereas he was a leader
without a country, Egypt was a country without a leader
[Ref. 18]. Both countries were briefly involved in a border
clash in July, 1977, following four years of exceedingly
deteriorating conditions
.
Libya was then armed by the Soviets who have since em-
barked on providing Qadhafi with modern and sophisticated
weaponry in quantities beyond his country's absorption capa-
city. The threats to destabilize Egypt's ally, Mimeiri of
Sudan by Ethiopia and Libya were also viewed in Egypt as
Soviet machinations to encircle Egypt. With Sadat's Jerusalem
trip, the subsequent Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty
with Israel, Sadat saw the Soviet's hand in the growing
regional and international opposition to Egypt. He tried to
improve his position with the United States while casting
doubt on the "peaceful intentions" of the Soviet Union. His
anti-Soviet rhetoric grew and in September 1981 he expelled
the Soviet ambassador from Cairo due to alleged interference
in Egypt's internal affairs, and generating sectarian sedition
[Ref. 19]. Accompanying these decisions were over 1,500
arrests made in September leading to the tragic events of
6 October 1981 [Ref. 20].
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To summarize Egypt's orientation or role conception as
perceived by Sadat up to this point, we would first emphasize
Egypt's centrality in the Arab world. Although that leader-
ship was cracked in 1967, and briefly regained in 1973 only
to pass to the Arabian Peninsula, the Egyptian elite and
Sadat see the constants of history and geography will give
Egypt back its natural role. In a book on Egypt and the
Arab League, Abdel Hamid Al-Muwafi [Ref. 21] writes "...and
any of these other [Arab] states... do not even have the strength
of a leading geographic position as does Egypt, so how then
will they compete for a leadership which they do not qualify."
And he later goes on to refute those advancing Saudi Arabia
the leadership role due to its oil revenue:
"...she is not capable of marshalling an effective military
force which may be needed to support the leadership role;
in addition, the extreme political conservatism of the re-
gime coupled with the influential American interests within
the regime add resistance to her carrying out a leadership
role .
"
Al-Muwafi sees Egypt's currently diminished status as ephemeral:
"
. . .because the economic problem which is the current element
of weakness in Egypt, is much easier to overcome than the
other weaknesses facing those other countries hoping to
participate with Egypt in performing the leadership role."
Secondly, Sadat ushered in the peace era a la Washington
with the political October War. He saw the futility of
defeating Israel militarily as long as the United States was
fully backing it. With that strategy in mind, the U.S. was
the superpower to court in order to achieve a just and equit-
able comprehensive peace in the region. The eventual reality
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of Egypt's separate peace and the ostracization of Egypt by
the Arab world could be reduced at the economic level by
American aid, Sadat reasoned.* However, the cultural and
psychological impact on the population could not be dealt
with using the new American connection. What's worse, is
Sadat's increasing to near total dependency on the U.S. due
to a growing domestic disillusion with his internal policies
,
combined with the strains in his relations with the socialist
countries. This illicited memories of the post 1967 period
when Nasser had become totally dependent on the Soviets
.
Neither situation was healthy, reasoned many Egyptian
intellectuals [Ref. 13:p. 34].
Thirdly, the Soviet Union became the "root of all evil"
[Ref. 22] in Sadat's parlance. One may question how much of
that reflected true Egyptian feeling and how much was to
bring Egyptian and U.S. interest closer together. However,
it is felt that the perception of a Soviet threat or of its
clients encircling Egypt, was and is still real in the mind
of the political and military leadership [Ref. 22] . This is
not to say they expect Soviet forces to invade Egypt but that
countries opposed to Egypt and her policies will use Soviet
weapons and influence to politically destabilize Egypt or a
*Sadat never imagined that the Arab reaction would reach
the level of hostility that it did due to his initiatives,
for he initially believed that he and President Carter would
deliver the promised comprehensive peace and bring prosperity
and stability to Egypt and the region.
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neighboring pro-Egyptian regime on the one hand or an actual
military confrontation with a Soviet supported regime on the
other.
Fourthly, Sadat and the Egyptian leadership within the
peace-era framework hoped to have the U.S. recognize the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and for the PLO to
recognize Israel's right to exist [Ref. 23]. They believed
that stability, which Egypt dearly needs to support economic
growth and foreign investment, could not be reached without
solving the crux of the Arab-Israeli problem: the Palestinian
question. Until this is solved, Egypt would remain on the
political periphery of the Arab world, unable to exercise its
'natural' leadership role. Its relations with the U.S., on
whom it relies heavily, would continue to levy a high cost so
long as the U.S. continues to pursue policies that are un-
popular in the region.
Finally, Egypt's nonalignment credentials were increasing-
ly coming under fire in the late 1970s as a direct result of
its close ties with the U.S. and the peace treaty with Israel.
At the sixth Nonaligned Conference of 1979 held in Havana,
there was an unsuccessful move to expel Egypt from the move-
ment. However, Egypt's position had weakened so much in the
1970s within the nonaligned movement that a Jeune Afrique
[Ref. 24] correspondent queried Boutros-Ghali if Mubarak was
rejoining the movement, "we have never stopped being a full
member of it" was the minister's reply. Moreover, "Egypt has
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always played a major role in nonalignment. The Camp David
agreements concealed that role somewhat...." added Boutros-
Ghali. A few weeks before Sadat's assassination, on the 20th
anniversary of the first nonaligned Summit, the Egyptian mini-
ster affirmed his country's responsibility for preserving the
nonaligned movement and to defend and protect its principles
from deviation [Ref. 25].
From this we can see that Egypt's diminished role in the
nonaligned movement was due to Sadat's* strategy of regaining
the Sinai and finding a solution equitable to the Palestinians
within an American framework. This framework was more appeal-
ing to Sadat since it would serve to tie Egypt and the United
States in the peace process, and Israel had historically been
more amenable to bilateral talks instead of international
forums. In addition, the nonaligned movement had deviated
from its founding principles and was advocating a "natural
alliance" with the countries of the socialist camp. The move-
ment was losing influence internationally and had come under
doubt in the U.S. A simple cost/benefit analysis by Sadat
indicated to him that efforts spent on the movement would
prove futile and that he ought to concentrate on weaning the
*At the institutional level there does not seem to have
been as great a reduction in emphasis on nonalignment in foreign
policy formulation. However, this was overshadowed by Sadat's
preferences. See discussion with Boutros-Ghali in Al-Siyasah
Al-Duwaliyah
, pp. 157-164, v. 17 (65), July 1981; also Foreign
minister Kamal Hassan Ali's remarks on Africa and nonalignment
in his 28 September speech to the NDP
.
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U.S. from Israel and make Egypt the linchpin of any American
strategy in the Middle Eas.t iRef. 26] .
The United States witnessed in a year's time deteriora-
tion in its strategic position in the region. The fall of the
Shah of Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the
seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca were rather ominous
.
Sadat analyzed the situation through Washingtonian spectacles
and began to play the Egyptian card which must have looked very
appealing by the end of 1979 to the American strategists
Hosni Mubarak was fortunate in October 1981 to have been
Sadat's Vice-president since April of 1975. He had a lot of
time to learn and appreciate the nuiances of running a govern-
ment in the strategic Middle East. When asked which was more
difficult, his responsibility when he was head of the Air
Force or as the president he did not hesitate to say the
latter, in a way almost wishing he was still in the military.
"The most burdensome thing that can happen to you in a devel-
oping country is that you get to be the president ... the mili-
tary with all its responsibilities is in actuality more
pleasurable. There is no comparison." [Ref. 27] The 1981
change of leadership may be of little consequence regarding
any structural changes in Egyptian foreign policy especially
since "...the foreign policy of a country is the sum of
various geopolitical, historical and economic components."
[Ref. 26] Egypt's goals and objectives will remain the same,
only the means might differ; emphasizing one aspect while
relegating another, it is a period of reassessment and not
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wholesale changes . The Mubarak regime has survived the initial
traumatic initiation on Egypt's throne, and had had three years
to smooth out all the bumps and develop the outlines for
future policies. It will be our task in the next section to
examine the "role enactment", the actions of the regime and
how it relates to its "role conception"
.
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IV . POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
In the next two chapters we will examine Egyptian rela-
tion with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Non-
aligned nations. Government and opposition views will be
presented as each group attempts to influence or carry out a
coherent foreign policy strategy.
On 14 October 1981, Mubarak was sworn in as President of
the Arab Republic of Egypt. He represented a change from his
predecessors, Nasser and Sadat. They were members of the Free
Officers of the 1952 Revolution. They had ended the rule of
the Mohamed Ali dynasty and returned the country to Egyptian
rule after an absence of over two millennia. Mubarak was a
new breed, he was a leader in the victorious October War
generation [Ref. 1] . Sadat made the break with the July
Revolution by his choice for the Vice-presidency and his
already started de-Nasserization program [Ref. 2].
The relation between the United States and Egypt in the
post-Sadat period had been marked with a seeming increase in
distance from that during Sadat's second term (1977-1981).
Mubarak is acting more independently from the U.S. and is
applying nonaligned language in his international behavior.
He is slowly but surely returning Egypt to the Arab fold and
had placed the normalization process with Israel in cold
storage. Moreover, the new Soviet ambassador to Cairo,
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Alexander Bolotogov, presented his credentials, to Mubarak on
24 September 19-84, thereby returning diplomatic representa-
tion to the ambassadorial level after a three year break
.
Has Mubarak really taken Egypt out of the tight American
orbit that it had found itself in at the close of the Sadat
era? Or is it simple the difference in style between the two
men? Most observers would agree that there has been a style
change. However, regarding the content of his foreign policy,
views differ and depend greatly on the analyst's political
and ideological leanings and your geographical location.
Some in Washington have allegedly complained that Egypt under
Mubarak has changed "180-degrees
"
, while other see Mubarak's
policies as a continuation of his predecessor, "...Mubarak is
a very clever Sadat in disguise." [Ref. 3]
A leading academic at the American University in Cairo,
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, wrote an article a year after Sadat's
assassination entitled "The Fight over Mubarak's Soul." He
takes on the continuity or change dilemma facing Mubarak and
suggests that change is imperative, "There will be a change.
The question is really how much change, in what direction,
and when will it take place." He sess that if Mubarak adheres
to the spirit and form of Sadat's major policies, there will
be continuity without much legitimacy; "The. consensus of all
observers ... is that Mubarak cannot afford to carry on Egypt's
politics as usual." [Ref. 4]
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Let us attempt in the coming pages to draw the outlines
of Mubarak's foreign policy as it concerns Egypt's American
connection. First of all Mubarak needed in October of 1981
to present a picture of stability and continuity in the
political process [Ref. 5] in order to save the country from
internal havoc and to secure international opinion and trust
in Egypt and his regime. Considering the assassination and
its potential fallout, the power transition was very smooth
and successful -- it was uneventful. This was a remarkable
achievement by any Third World standard.
A week after his inauguration, Mubarak commenting on U.S.
relations said, "We look forward to have very good relations
with the United States, like any other country, the other
European countries. The United States is helping us in many
fields -- in the economic and military fields." Mubarak de-
scribed any improvement in Egyptian-Arab relations positively,
"...It is in the interest of the United States that there be
stability and good relations with the Arabs." With regards
to the Soviet Union he explained that Egypt is not against
the establishment of good relations with any state in the
whole world. It will not accept at all any state interfering
in its internal affairs, and that relations will be established
with all states but on equal basis. He added "...I hope you
will not get the impression that I intend to start any nego-
tiations with the Soviets at present." [Ref. 6]
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Dr. Boutros-Ghali , Egypt's Minister of State for foreign
affairs, is a well respected academic and public servant whose
family has long been involved in Egyptian politics . He is
currently the longest serving member on Mubarak's cabinet.
He also has ties with Al-Ahram and has been director of its
center for political and strategic studies and editor of its
Arabic quarterly, International Politics . He is heavily in-
volved in the design of Egypt's nonalignment and African
policies and has represented Mubarak and Sadat before him in
official capacities. During the Nasser years he was an ardent
pan-Arabist who believed in Egypt's centrality in the region
and its potential leading role in the Third World and the non-
aligned nations. One cannot say that he changed his beliefs
during the Sadat era but only that they did not find expression
He represents the preponderant view of those career officers
at the foreign ministry.
A few days after Mubarak's assumption of power, Ghali
stated that Egypt, as a state, is interested in maintaining
good relations with the world's great powers. He added that
Egypt's relations with the United States must be viewed in
light of the fact that Egypt has no desire to play the role
of policeman in the area for anybody, "We are a nonaligned
state and our special relationship with the United States
cannot possible influence our nonalignment." [Ref. 7] A day
later in a London interview, Ghali affirmed the goal of peace
in the Middle East:
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"...The goal of Egyptian policy is still to achieve an over-
all, just and durable peace in the Middle East... Egypt
welcomes any new initiative whether made by countries or
international organizations with regard to the Middle East."
[Ref. 8]
He added that Egypt's diplomacy does not adhere to any specific
methods to achieve this goal, because the goal itself is what
counts
.
Similar remarks were made during the Sadat era, however
they were not implemented, they reflected a consensus of views
at the ministerial levels which became empty rhetoric by Sadat's
actions. There was a gap between some elements of the "orien-
tation" and "enactment" during the latter part of Sadat's
regime, specifically in the nonalignment sphere. This had
become a linchpin of Egyptian foreign policy under Nasser and
some would argue that it had an even earlier start [Ref. 9]
.
The notion of nonalignment and positive neutralism had been
firmly implanted in the minds of the Egyptian elite.* There
was great relief by most if not all Egyptians when Sadat ex-
pelled the Soviets in July of 1972. Even though the official
government sponsored media had not attacked or questioned
Egypt's nonaligned credentials during the 1967-1972 years
when it was evident that Egypt increased her dependency on
the Soviet Union, there were real opposition to this develop-
ment which manifested itself fully after the 1973 war.
*This was brought out to the author by Saad Eddin Ibrahim
in an interview conducted at American University, Cairo, in
September 1984.
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The masses and the elite saw the Egypt of the late seven-
ties in similar light as that of Nasser's following the 1967
war. Sadat merely shifted Egypt's earlier dependency on the
Soviet Union to the United States. It could be argued that
had Sadat's promises to Egypt's impoverished masses of pros-
perity -- exaggerated as they were -- been achieved, that the
complaints about the departure from nonalignment would have
fallen on deaf ears . Politics and economics in Egypt are
closely related to the leadership's calculus of survival.
Moustapha Amin , an old and influential journalist with
ties to the original Wafd party, recently compared Egypt's
relation with the United States under Mubarak and Sadat. He
said "Egypt in Mubarak's era is not sitting on America's lap
but is sitting next to her. You will also notice that there
is room there for the Soviet Union to also sit down." [Ref. 10]
Sadat had hoped to make the United States dependent on Egypt
and not Israel, and for their relationship to reflect that
position. He wished to prove to the U.S. that it is in her
interest to deal with Egypt and that this will help America's
interests, plans, and policies in the region much more than
if she relied on Israel; Egypt would replace Israel. Moreover,
the U.S. must be made to realize, in theory and in practice,
that her interests in Egypt are more vital than in Israel.
Therefore, for Sadat this meant weaving Egypt into an American
regional strategy [Ref. 10]. This obviously limited the op-
tions available to the Egyptian leadership in the conduct of
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its foreign policy and Mubarak was determined from the start
to widen his margin of freedom in his external policies.
Mubarak had announced that he intends to continue Sadat's
policies . There were immediate skepticism by some Arab lead-
ers and even by the internal opposition, claiming this to be
just a formality. Ghali defended Mubarak calling Sadat's
policies concerning the Middle East crisis " . . .a basic princi-
ple in our foreign policy .. .Egypt intends to continue the
peace process established by the Camp David agreements as
long as there are no other viable alternatives being developed
and accepted by the parties concerned." [Ref. 12] Mubarak's
Egypt though was not making the Camp David framework the sole
vehicle for peace in the area. He was willing to consider
other ideas as long as they were acceptable by all parties
concerned [Ref. ll:p. 51]. Egypt would no longer give an
immediate 'no' to new plans. The Fahd/Fez plan or a call for
an international conference were considered with regards to
any positive points they may bring forward. That does not
mean that Egypt's leadership had become less realistic, on the
contrary, there was no harm, they reasoned, in considering
those other options so as not to unduly upset their Arab
neighbors or undermine international efforts. The Egyptian
leadership was and still is quick to point out that any frame-
work for peace needs to be implemented and that necessitates
the cooperation of the U.S. and Israel; hence, they remain
realistic when evaluating all the plans and their chance for
implementation [Ref. 12].
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Mubarak is aware that in order to attract foreign capital
investment and to face his current economic problems he needs
a stable domestic environment. To him, the quest for peace
is directly related to the above goal,
"We opted for peace because we want to save the enormous
funds that we spend on arms and equipment to use them
for the prosperity of the Egyptian people .. .there is no
retreat from peace... what befell us throughout 30 years
is enough."
He also was hoping to exploit Egypt's special relations with
Israel to Egypt's advantage: "I would like to tell the Arab
brothers that our excellent relations with Israel will be in
the interests of the Arabs in the future. We will be able to
solve their differences with Israel." Mubarak was hoping to
turn what many had considered a liability into an asset.
However, subsequent events in Lebanon have made that most
difficult. [Ref. 12]
Ibrahim Sa'dah is a young journalist with a bright future
and he brings new and fresh blood in the government supported
press. His columns are avidly read by Egypt's politicized
college students who tend to accept his analysis more readily
than by those "established" figures in print. Writing a few
weeks after Sadat's assassination on prospects for peace and
the coming Israeli evacuation of Sinai, he notes that Egypt
cannot afford to break the peace plan:
" [Egypt] would lose world support and more importantly
still the trust and friendship of the United States...
If this happens no U.S. president would then dare to
continue to support Egyptian policy and not a single
American voice would be raised in favor of providing
the Egyptian Army with its arms requirements. We
would not hear a single word of support for the eco-
nomic aid that the United States gives to Egypt...
a
retaliatory war would be bound to break out between
Egypt and Israel .. .Egypt despite itself would return
to the Soviet Union which would not receive it with
an embrace but would force it to go down on its knees
and ask for forgiveness and pardon for what it had
done to it .... "
"On the other hand, Israel would appear before the
west as the only trusted ally in the 'Middle East
and the only one who really desires to achieve
peace .
"
"Not a single voice would be raised should Israel
wage a lightning war against Egypt; would not hear
a single sympathetic voice if Israel succeeded in
reoccupying Sinai and once again reached the banks
of the Suez Canal... We would have to cancel all
our programs of securing our food supplies and
developing our economy and country." [Ref. 13]
We can readily see how this commentary's point of depart-
ure is first and foremost Egypt's national interest which the
Mubarak regime has been keen on attaining. But his is dif-
ferent from the "Egypt First" philosophy of Sadat in style
and presentation. Mubarak is not attacking the Arab leaders
or their country men as Sadat had often done [Ref. 14]
.
Mubarak in an interview with Barbara Walters before his in-
auguration ceremony asserted that "Egypt is an Arab country,
we are not part of the west or the east." [Ref. 15] And on
another occasion in March 1982 he said, "we are an inseparable
part of the Arab world, and we have had good relations with it
for hundreds of years." [Ref. 16] It is of interest that
when Mubarak declared his policy of not attacking any of the
Arab leaders in the Egyptian media he felt some obligation to
couch it as continuation of Sadat's policy. Mubarak suggests
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that Sadat was about to embark on that same policy and that
it had been discussed by the cabinet [Ref. 17].
Also, Mubarak has not been openly emphasizing Egypt's
leadership role in the region. His predecessor had used that
motif on numerous occasions in his verbal attacks on the Arab
countries . This does not indicate that Mubarak believes any
less in Egypt's role but is more careful and sensitive in his
utterances. For Sadat the Arabs without Egypt could do
nothing while Egypt is great with or without the Arabs. In
contrast, Mubarak has asserted that the Arab world cannot
forego Egypt and vice versa [Ref. 18] .
Mubarak is not an adherant of Arab unity from the Gulf to
the Atlantic for he does not believe the necessary conditions
will come about in the near future, he sees Arab unity as an
out-dated concept. Instead he says it is "high time for an
effective Arab forum able to solve problems better than that
available today in the Arab League in Tunis." [Ref. 19]
Mubarak is advocating a unified stand by the Arab countries
on vital and strategic issues as a first step. Reflecting
this assessment, an Al-Ahram article in the wake of the
Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights states
:
"Israel is well aware of the Arab reality and knows
perfectly well the limits of Arab anger and of
possible Arab moves.... It knows only too well that
the U.S. attitude will not go beyond words of con-
demnation unless there is a unified Arab plan in
the face of danger... [we need] an Arab decision
based on sound Arab vision, on a unified stand and
designated roles and, above all, on an accurate
knowledge of the balance of power and western and
U.S. interests throughout our Arab region." [Ref. 20]
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The article goes on to dissuade the fears of any Arab leader
(mainly Saudi Arabia) who might feel that Egypt wishes to be
the only go-in-between for the Arabs in Washington, "We are
convinced that more than one Arab capital can play the newly
expected role with the Reagan administration."
We have presented earlier how Sadat hoped to become the
linchpin in any American strategy in the Middle East as the
means to secure economic and military aid for Egypt. Sadat
was stressing the bilateral nature of this relationship,
hoping to keep Israel out of the equation; that is to say,
Israel would not become a factor in any U.S. economic or
military aid/sale proposals to Egypt. The American decision
process would be solely based on Egypt's case as the trust-
worthy ally of the United States, who bellows out anti-com-
munist and anti-Soviet rhetoric and is willing to act if
need be as a regional policeman.
Mubarak was in Washington in September/October of 1981
hoping to speed up delivery of promised U.S. aircraft and
other military hardware which Sadat had queried about earlier
in August. These included the advanced F-16 fighter which at
least to the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) would symbolize an
equal or near equal treatment of Egypt and Israel militarily.
The United States even though it had earlier provided Egypt
thirty-five F-4 aircraft, was perceived to be dragging its
feet. Mubarak, being the ex-Commandant of the EAF, was
probably even more sensitive to the armed forces' needs in
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general and the air force in particular. He had witnessed
Sadat's strategy to lure the United States and saw that the
results did not match expectations. Sadat, Mubarak, and the
Egyptian decision-making elite firmly believed that the
United States should be more forthcoming on its promises to
Egypt and to deal with her on an equal footing with Israel.
Sadat knew that he can maintain his immediate credibility
within Egypt by regaining the Sinai, but he also was keen on
soliciting U.S. pressure on Israel to be more compromising on
the autonomy issue. This was directly tied to any future
role he aspired to play in the Arab world. In a September
1981 speech in Alexandria, Sadat was attacking those who were
involved in sectarian sedition. He took the occasion however,
to call for peace in the region:
"
. . .We shall continue to work with Israel for the sake
of the Palestinian issue. We will not speak on behalf
of the Palestinians or the rest of the Arabs, but we
want to end the Israeli occupation of the East Bank
and Gaza so that the Palestinians can sit with the
Israelis as I have done and ask for their land and
reach an agreement as we have done with Israel." [Ref. 21]
All this must have been later used in the 'lessons learned'
category for the new Mubarak regime. He witnessed how Sadat
was unable to make any progress with Israel on the autonomy
talks and the frustrations during the two weeks at Camp David*
reflecting an erroneous Egyptian assessment of influence and
*See former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Kamel's
memoirs of the Camp David negotiations in Al-Salam Al-Da'i,
The Lost Peace, Jeddah , 1984.
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power in the Egyptian - American - Israeli triangle. Also,
the manner in which his predecessor met his death, the per-
ceptive rise in Islamic fundamentalism with its attacks on
the west with its support of Zionism as well as the atheist
east, in addition to the abuses of power and open corruption
within the Sadat entourage must also have left a mark on
Mubarak. Moreover, Egypt's unacceptable alienation in the
Arab world and diminutive position in the nonaligned movement
in conjunction with the above realities forced upon Mubarak
a new tack or approach to handle the United States as Egypt
began to reopen diplomatically, politically, and economically
to the world once more.
Mubarak assessed Sadat's American strategy to be more
costly than beneficial to his regime's survival and in meeting
Egypt's national interests. He was fully aware that Egypt
needed the United States or more precisely those services that
only the U.S. could provide -- peace, economic development and
aid. He still wishes to have strong bilateral relations with
the U.S. where Egypt's requests are not subjected to an
Israeli litmus test. Mubarak wants to be able to deal with
Reagan or any U.S. president as a leading member of a united
— at least in vision -- Arab world. He has foregone any
dream that Sadat might have fancied about replacing Israel as
the American ally in the region. Egypt's inherent strength
and power source will once again stem from an Arab instead of
an American fountain. This more than any other action caused
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a shift in Egyptian conception of the new reality. However,
Egypt remains desirous to court the U.S. as Kamal Hassan Ali
said in a lecture at the Commanders and Staff College in
October 1983: "In its relations with the U.S., Egypt does
not forget the realities of the age and the advantages which
it, its people and its region, can gain from friendship with
the greatest power in today's world." [Ref. 22]
Moustapha Khalil, the former deputy NDP leader for foreign
affairs, and prime minister under Sadat, is considered to
favor the policies of the late president and hence dubbed a
'Sadatist* by some [Ref. 23]. In a September 1981 speech
commemorating the opening session of the second NDP Congress
in Cairo, Khalil endorsed the rights of the "fraternal Pales-
tinian people". He said,
"...the real guarantee of security and stability in the
region is the settlement of the Palestinian problem in
a way that will respond to the legitimate rights and
hopes of the Palestinian people and provide security
for all. Claims to the contrary are gross prevarications
in which some circles are taking refuge by claiming
that the tension and instability in the region are not
related to the Palestinian problem but to regional
differences and bickerings as well as rivalries among
some of the ruling regimes. These circles have for-
gotten that letting the Palestinian problem remain
unsolved means the continued prevalence of the feeling
that the Israeli peril exceeds the Soviet peril... this
feeling increased in the wake of the Israeli raid
against the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the extensive
military operations in Lebanon .... It is essential to
start solving the Palestinian problem, because other-
wise the USSR will be able to penetrate into the
region from the inside." [Ref. 24]
What is significant here is that an influential 'Sadatist'
is reaffirming the rights of Palestinians and saying that
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before we face aggression external to the region, we need to
solve the main problem within the region. The primacy of
that conflict on regional politics could never be underesti-
mated. The goals of Sadat and Mubarak coincide but their
relevant importance on the national agenda differs as do the
means dedicated to their fulfillment.
Egypt under Sadat and Mubarak is a firm believer in peace
as a long-term strategy as was presented earlier. This in
itself also causes constraints on its options in foreign
policy. Since war is not a part of Egypt's strategy today
or in the near future then the Soviet Union cannot be a
convincing card for Egypt to parade with. The peace options
rest with the United States, Israel, and to a lesser degree
with a unified European stand, and the Soviet Union. An
additional force that would be influential is a unified Arab
will, if and when it materializes. Therefore with the exist-
ing structural constraints on Egyptian foreign policy Mubarak's
only immediate option was to bring back the nonalignment
principles into his policies, open-up to Western Europe, and
in the medium term to work on getting back to the Arab fold.
Also in the latter category we could include the cautious
normalizing with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries,
but these were not viewed as pressing at the time.
Two objectives would be hoped for. First, to show the
U.S. that Egypt is a regional and international actor which
must be considered in any dealings in the area independent
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of its relation with Israel. Secondly, to make Egypt less
dependent on the United States, even if this is not actually
achieved, it will still be a positive psychological boost.
We have seen how even under the best of conditions rela-
tions between two nations can still be less than ideal . The
Israeli invasion of June 1983 and its subsequent consequences
have caused a tremendous strain on Egyptian-Israeli relations
and a nearly equal one on Egyptian-American relations .
Egypt's decisional calculus was heavily tasked to maintain a
balance between its national interests and Egyptian and Arab
dignity. Egypt and the Arab's helplessness became evident
in the face of the events of that summer. Egypt hoped to use
its influence with Israel and the U.S. to contain any Israeli
expansionist ideas but it discovered how little leverage it
had in June of 1982.
Up to April of that year Egypt had according to Osama Al-
Baz, the director of the presidential political office and a
most influential member of the foreign policy team, been
successful in holding back Israel. He said:
"President Sadat and later President Mubarak spoke to
Israel about the danger of playing the game of Lebanese
politics ... the escalation of tension might reach a
point where it will be difficult to control... I recall
that four times, as a precautionary measure, we con-
tacted Israel in order to prevent it from carrying out
military operations. We also contacted European
parties and the United States so that they too would
contact Israel and take a firm line with it." [Ref. 25]
The United States came under attack during that summer in
the Egyptian press. The Israeli invasion and the seige. of
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Beirut carried a very high cost for a Mubarak regime that is
maintaining special relations with the United States who is
seen as unwilling to control or restrain Israel.
A review of the leading Egyptian newspapers a few days
following the invasion indicate how the U.S. could not es-
cape being implicated in the event. Al-Goumhoriya , one of
the three national newspapers, in an editorial on 9 June says
"Israel is challenging all values and international con-
ventions, depending on the special status it enjoys in
U.S. policy concerns and the special relationship it
has with the U.S While one cannot reconcile one-
self to its consequences if this means further Israeli
aggression. .. .Will the U.S. continue to accept this
special relationship with Israel even if Israel grossly
violates its commitments toward this relationship and
continues its agression?"
Mubarak, in a June interview, reflected his disillusion
with the manner in which the U.S. had handled the events.
Replying to a question about the effect of a long Israeli
stay in Lebanon, he said:
"It will affect not only Egyptian-American relations, but
American-Arab relations. The image of the United States
is not only at stake. If the crisis continues and
Israeli forces stay there for quite a long time, it would
create much more trouble. The United States will lose
more ground, and some other power will gain." [Ref. 26]
He added that if the United States fails to bring about a
settlement to this crisis, the whole world will blame the
U.S., especially the Arab world, and that the Soviet Union
would be the only country to gain from this
.
During this period there were calls urging for change in
Egyptian foreign policy in view of the events in Lebanon.
The leftist opposition National Progressive Unionist Grouping
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(NPUG) party made such a demand in its press organ Al-Aha li in
an article by Philip Jallub. He does not suggest that Egypt
should attack Israel, for "such folly or fancy did not cross
our mind." [Ref. 27] He does suggest that there is a basic
fault in Egyptian foreign policy that should be rectified;
this can be done by convening a conference for all national
forces, according to Jallub. Even the respectable Al-Ahram
urged for a change in U.S. foreign policy in the region
[Ref. 28] .
Mubarak had hoped that his efforts at convincing Reagan
to initiate a dialogue with the Palestinians would bear fruit.
There was a general feeling at the foreign ministry and the
cabinet that Israel's invasion was timed to destroy any hope
for such a dialogue. The American veto of the French draft
resolution on Lebanon at the UN security council was a great
disappointment for Egypt and Mubarak [Ref. 29]. The United
States was judged not qualified to resolve the crisis [Ref.
30]; while opposition papers urged breaking off relations
with the United States [Ref. 32] forcing the national press
to defend government policies [Ref. 33].
In a possible move to deflect some of the criticism, the
weekly Mayo magazine, mouthpiece of the ruling NDP
,
published
an article by Ibrahim Sa'dah. He questions why some people
are angry over the Soviet's inaction in Lebanon. To those
who feel that the Soviets are obligated to defend the
Palestinians he writes, "We are trying to impose on them a
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stand that has not crossed their mind and does not even
deserve consideration." He adds in an urge to marshal Arab
unity, "Are we so naive as to imagine we can impose our
policies on the superpowers and push them toward defending
our interests and fighting for the sake of our cause?...."
[Ref. 34]
Moustapha Khalil, summed up the regime's position when he
said
:
"In evaluating its foreign policy the United States looks
at things only within the context of its differences with
the Soviet Union. We say to it: there is only one threat
to the area -- Israel -- and the invasion of Lebanon has
categorically proved that Israel is the principal threat
to the stability of the Arab countries ... .The Soviet Union
is another threat, but the degrees of threat differ."
[Ref. 34:p. 11]
The Reagan plan of 1 September 1982 was greeted with
guarded optimism in the Arab world. Egypt's media welcomed
the initiative [Ref. 35] and demanded a unified Arab stand to
implement its positive aspects . Some even compared it to the
initiative of the late president Eisenhower in 1956 compelling
Israel to withdraw from Sinai [Ref. 36]. By mid-November, Al-
Ahram was wondering if the U.S. would follow-up the "Reagan
Plan" with some concrete action in order to convince the
doubters that "this initiative was not merely a U.S. pill to
calm Arab feelings against what appeared to be U.S. -Israeli
collusion in Lebanon...." [Ref. 37]
Mohamed Heikal provided his views on the events in




"I believe the plan [Reagan's] was proposed in the after-
math of what happened in Beirut to absorb the anger and
agony of the Arab world, and it has done that. I believe
that although Reagan has the power to apply the plan, he
does not have the intention to use that power ... .Because
Israel does not want it, and Israel is there on the
ground." [Ref. 38]
The impact of the Lebanese conflict on American-Egyptian
relations can be clearly seen in the above discussion. We
shall not engage ourselves in the details of the remaining
events of the Lebanese saga for it would only be more of the
same. You would see two major policies reflecting those
forces on the ground: Israel and Syria. The United States
is unable to successfully match policy and implements in
Lebanon and suffers a tragic setback, losing credibility in
the eyes of its regional supporters. Egypt, meanwhile, is
unable to influence any of the parties to the conflict and
resides itself to innocuous diplomatic shuttles [Ref. 39]
and escorting Yasser Arafat from his seige in Tripoli.
One essential point that should be covered is the shelling
by the U.S. 6th fleet units of Syrian and Druze positions near
Beirut at the end of 1983. Two main points came about from
these actions
:
(1) The increased disillusionment by the average man on
the street in Cairo with the U.S. [Ref. 40], causing
the Egyptian regime to distance itself from its
friend's actions in its backyard. This again re-
flected the relative impotence of the Egyptian state
to control events which was not missed by the politi-
cized masses.
(2) Syria's Assad became a bigger hero in the Arab world.
He took on the legendary U.S. 6th fleet and recipro-
cated the bloody nose. The United States had
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inadvertently elevated Assad's status in the Arab world and
the key actor keeping Mubarak from returning to the Arab
fold where Egypt could exercise and regain some lost influ-
ence. The United States by engaging and shelling Syrian
forces was enhancing Assad's position regardless of the
military outcome. Mubarak and all the moderate Arab leaders
were forced to criticize the event due to domestic pressures
.
In Cairo, they wondered if the U.S. was purposely elevating
Assad
.
Therefore, the combination of U.S. and Israeli actions
made many Egyptian observers comment that the U.S. was back to
its old tricks of the 1960s. Dr. Murad Ghaleb, a former Egypt-
ian foreign minister and currently a member of the opposition,
suggested that the U.S. had established its policy towards
Egypt with the following points in mind [Ref . 41] :
(1) To keep Egypt within its borders, that is by separating
her from the Arab world.
(2) To limit the size and available armament of the Egypt-
ian military forces.
(3) To have Egypt sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty.
(4) To establish peace between Egypt and Israel.
Many political observers would agree and also add that the
Soviet Union would not have been unhappy with that either.
Historically, within the Egyptian decision-making elite there
has been a feeling, with varying intensity, that the super-
powers would never allow Egypt to reach its full political or
military potential. They reason that an independently power-
ful Egypt would never be tolerated by the two giants
.
Mubarak, during a trip to the United States, presented in
a speech to the council on Foreign Relations in New York five




(1) The existence of an identity of interests between the
United States and any state in the Middle East. He
emphasized that there are common interests in specific
fields and that a good deal of good intentions await
the U.S. But this does not mean that there is a
general consensus on the common interests. Therefore,
the U.S. should not be totally biased toward one state
while it is mapping out its Middle East policy.
(2) The second myth is that the best solution to the Middle
East problem is to leave it without a solution. He
argues that this is based on two wrong beliefs:
A. There is a specific problem which is impossible to
solve
.
B. Time alone will provide solutions to the compli-
cated problems
.
(3) A third myth says that the Arab world's weakness and
division is in the interests of the United States.
The fact is, he asserts, that the Arab division creates
more instability and tension in the region and it will
affect the flow of oil to the west and open the door
for foreign interference. A strong Arab front -- one
of unity of purpose and not constitutional unity --
will provide a real opportunity for cooperation on the
basis of equality and mutual respect.
(4) Another myth is that the continuation of the Iran-Iraq
war might serve the U.S. interests. Mubarak is con-
vinced that it is not in the U.S. interest to see
tension rising in the Gulf; the security and stability
of this area bears a direct impact on the prosperity
of the industrialized world.
(5) The last myth states that the establishment of a
Palestinian entity is a detrimental thing for the west.
But, he suggests, the majority of the Palestinians
who will set up this entity currently reside in the
West Bank and the Gaza strip. They are for the most
part moderates wishing for amicable relations with
other states. Furthermore, the Palestinian entity will
face an enormous task of reconstruction and repatria-
tion. This will cause the entity to cultivate close
ties with the moderate Arab states who are able to
provide the needed help.
A presentation of a perceptive article [Ref. 43] in Al-
Ahram during the spring of this year regarding American-Egyptian
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relations will aid in summarizing how Egypt has viewed this
relationship. Dr. Al-Mashat, of Cairo University, in his
article, hopes to provide a guideline for the continuation of
the close ties which both countries enjoy and containing those
factors which can harm cooperation. Before offering his
solution, he advances two fundamental mistakes he believes
the United States committed while formulating its relations
with Egypt. The first was when the
"United States did not look at Egyptian-U .S . relations
from their dual aspect and did not seek to develop them
on the basis of joint interests of both countries. On
the contrary the United States turned this dual and
mutual aspect into a complex one by including Israeli
interests as a basic element in the equation .. .thus
letting the channels of political, economic, and mili-
tary interaction and exchange pass through Israel first...
this is bound to have negative effects on the relations
between the two countries, particularly when Egyptian-
Israeli relations are not in harmony...."
The second mistake advanced by Mashat is:
"the attempt of the United States to impose the U.S.
national security view on the countries of the area,
particularly Egypt. The U.S. view [Strategic Consensus]
is based on encircling and containing Soviet influence
in the world as a primary condition for the achievement
of security and stability .... Since the Arab countries,
including Egypt, regard Arab national security differ-
ently from that of the U.S. and consider that the
essence of the former is solving the Palestinian prob-
lem, it is natural that this should affect the warmth
of Egyptian-U .S . relations since Egypt is a central
regional country that is basically interested in
solving the regional conflict whereas the United States
as a superpower is more interested in the international
conflict .
"
In addition Mashat writes that U.S. response to Egypt's
attempts to restore its relations with the sisterly Arab
states, and to crystallize a regional national concept of
Arab security have been less than enthusiastic.
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Turning to his recommendations, Mashat feels it is impera-
tive that Egyptian relations be based on mutual respect for
the political will of both sides and, consequently, the inde-
pendence of the Egyptian will and decision-making must always
be recognized without angering the United States. That these
relations be kept out of the vortex of current-events such as
the American elections. Moreover,
"The United States must help Egypt in its attempt to
regain a central Egyptian political role in the Arab
region. The U.S. should not consider this as a
threat to its interest since a central Egyptian role
would be a unifying factor and would lessen the
causes of disruption .. .contributing to the Arab
national consensus .
"
He compares the current U.S. "extreme support and bias"
in favor of Israel with that during the 1967-1973 period,
with a reminder of the earlier result. He concludes that
"the decision-makers in both countries should not view
these elements of tension in light of election year
alone, for they are more deeply rooted and permanent
than merely election campaigns . Trying to deal with
them requires basic changes in realization, understand-
ing, and mutual policies."
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v • POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE
SOVIET UNION' AND THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT
A. USSR
The Soviet Union once enjoyed a great latitude in its con-
duct with Egypt, especially following the June War. This was
greatly reduced with Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisors
(15,000-20,000) in July of 1972. Egyptian-Soviet relations
continued from bad to worse with little exception reaching
their nadir in September of 1981 with the expulsion of the
Soviet ambassador and other officials [Ref . 1] . Our discus-
sion here will deal primarily with the period following the
September events on the eve of Mubarak's assumption of power.*
Mubarak inherited a soured relationship with the Soviets
from Sadat. In March 1976, Sadat cancelled the treaty of
friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union; in January
1980, in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Sadat
instructed the Soviet government to reduce its staff in Cairo
to be more in line with the number of Egyptian diplomats in
Moscow (12). Moreover, the Egyptian ambassador designate,
Samih Anwar, to Moscow had remained in Cairo as relations
between the two countries continued to sour. By October the
*For a discussion of earlier Egyptian-Soviet relations see
M. Heikal's The Cairo Documents ; Road to Ramadan ; and The
Sphinx and the Commissar . Also, A. Z. Rubinstein's Red Star
on the Nile.
55
diplomatic representation in both countries had been reduced
to the Charge d' Affairs level.
There were early indications that the strained relations
between the two countries would not be a permanent facet of
Egyptian foreign policy. President Mubarak, in an interview
a week after his election, replied to a question about his
country's future Soviet relations by expressing the need to
establish normal relations with all states but on an equal
basis [Ref. 2], A few days later Mubarak again predicted
better relations
"Time is certain to improve relations between the two
countries. As to the conditions .. .namely , mutual re-
spect and noninterference in our affairs . This was
the only problem which harmed the friendly relations
between the two countries." [Ref. 3]
By late January of 1982, it was reported that the Soviet
Union had been given permission by Egypt to increase its em-
bassy supported staff [Ref. 4]. Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan
Ali was quick to assure the United States that the possible
improvement in relations with Moscow would not affect rela-
tions with Washington which he hopes will get even better
[Ref. 5] . Al-Ahram was also quick to downplay Egypt's request
for Soviet experts [Ref. 6] . The stress was on the economic
rational for the decision and that it was devoid of any politi-
cal consideration. The 66 Soviet experts were expected to
carry out previously contracted work at various Soviet equipped
industrial complexes [Ref. 7].
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Following Mubarak's February 1982 trip to Washington, the
Egyptian press was in defense of his policies , one of which
was the return of the Soviet experts . The chief editor of
Al-Akhbar defended that decision tagging it as a continuation
of Sadat's policies
"...Sadat repeatedly said before expelling the Soviet
ambassador from Egypt that Egypt is not against normal
relations with the Soviet Union and if Moscow takes
one step, Egypt is prepared to take two steps....
Therefore there is nothing new in the matter...." [Ref. 8]
The popular journalist Ibrahim Sa'dah upheld the return
of the Soviet technicians and future normalization in a com-
mentary geared to calm the "sensational" reports in some U.S.
circles. He also provided his views on Egypt's experience
with the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets were once Egypt's
ally, "they would not let us make friends with those who were
not friendly with them or cooperate with those who threatened
or condemmed them." Sa'dah continues "...it is not necessary
for the Egyptian and Soviet peoples to embrace, and it is not
expected that the two countries will become close... what is
required is that there be normal relations." In close he
ridicules those expecting Egypt to restore cooperation with
the Soviet Union at the expense of deteriorating relations
with the United States. [Ref. 9]
Mubarak and the Egyptian leadership have been extremely
cautious in approaching the Soviet Union. Each gesture
toward the Kremlin was backed by several to Washington to
eliminate any possible misunderstandings, this was especially
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true with this first step. The Egyptian leadership did not
hesitate to criticize the Soviet Union. Such a stand was
taken following the return of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty,
when the Soviet permanent UN envoy delivered a message criti-
cal of Egypt's foreign policies. Dr. Esmat Abdel Meguid, then
permanent Egyptian representative at the UN, delivered a
message at that forum in response to the Soviet position
[Ref. 10]. An earlier criticism of the Soviet Union occurred
a few days following Sadat's assassination. The Soviet
government released a statement to the effect that pressure
is being exerted on Egypt and that attempts are being made to
interfere in Egypt in its domestic affairs. Egypt countered
by accusing the Soviet Union of interfering in its domestic
policy and those of Chad and Afghanistan [Ref. 11]
.
Within the realm of nonaligned principles which Egypt was
now reasserting under Mubarak, it did need to work toward
normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. Four months
before the Lebanese war, Boutros-Ghali was commenting on the
Soviet role in the peace process. He said,
"We did not exclude the Soviet Union ... there is an
invitation to the Soviet Union as one of the big
five powers... the only difference pertains to
timing, stage, and role of the Soviet Union... when
we move from the first stage to the third and
fourth stages...." [Ref. 1]
Ibrahim Naf i
'
, writing six weeks after the Lebanese war, sees
cooperation of the superpowers as a necessary condition to
solve the Palestinian problem. Naf i ' possibly goes beyond
Ghali when he suggests "...we should not belittle the Soviet
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role .. .despite the fact that it lacks the capabilities to
move the situation toward a solution, it can obstruct a com-
prehensive solution...." [Ref. 13] Throughout all this,
Mubarak was always asserting that "We have a special relation-
ship with it [U.S.] and I cannot abandon this special
relationship." [Ref. 14]
The death of Brezhnev provided the stage for possible im-
provement in relations between the two countries. Mamdouh
Salem was sent to Moscow as the Egyptian representative at the
funeral of the Soviet leader. These talks were supposedly
held with Vasiliy Kuznetsov, first deputy chairman of the USSR
Supreme Soviet. Subsequently, Anatoliy Gromyko , son of the
Soviet foreign minister, payed an unofficial visit to Egypt
in January 1983. These were followed by Nikolai Baybakov • s
stopover in Cairo airport enroute to and from Addis Ababa
[Ref. 15]. He was met by assistant foreign minister Ashaf i
'
Abdel Hamid, again this was in an unofficial capacity.
Baybakov was supposed to have delivered three Soviet condi-
tions for the return of ambassadors. First, to solve the
problems of the Egyptian debt to the Soviet Union. Secondly,
to expand the range of cooperation between the two countries
.
Thirdly, to require some guarantees that what happened in the
last few years will not be repeated [Ref. 16] . In May, an
Egyptian commercial and industrial delegation signed a new
trade protocol in Moscow between the two countries worth in
excess of $200 million [Ref. 17] . It was the first such pro-
tocol to be signed in six years.
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Concurrent with these meetings, the Seventh Nonaligned
Summit was convening in New Delhi . Egypt placed great impor-
tance on this summit as Mubarak headed the Egyptian delegation.
Throughout this period there were unsubstantiated reports of
'secret' talks being held with the Soviet Union [Ref. 18],
and reports that Cairo had hoped to resume normal relations
with Moscow prior to the nonaligned summit [Ref. 19] . Mubarak
at this time was affirming the Soviet Union's political im-
portance and using the case of India as a model for foreign
policy conduct
"The Soviet Union is a superpower and we cannot ignore
it. We are a nonaligned state just like India, which
has special industrial and economic relations with
the Soviet Union and at the same time relations with
the United States." [Ref. 20]
Meanwhile, Kamal Hassan Ali confirmed that "1983 would witness
the exchange of ambassadors between Egypt and the eastern bloc,
Cyprus and Soviet Union...." [Ref. 21]
The influential Osama Al-Baz, Mubarak's political speech
writer and director of the presidential political office,
reflected the government's irritation over the U.S. veto in
August at the UN over Israeli settlements in the occupied
territories in a press interview. At the same time, he was
blaming the Arabs for not taking a unified clear-cut stand.
He added that it was unrealistic for any state to think of
distancing the Soviet Union from the area, and that Egypt will
never seek to keep away the Soviet Union or any state interest-
ed in achieving peace and able to make any contribution to it
[Ref. 22] .
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During the same week, the opposition NPUG party called for the
exchange of ambassadors with the Soviet Union in its party
organ, Al-Ahali {Ref. 23].
The government however, was still cautious in its diplo-
matic relations with the Soviet Union. Oleg Grinevskiy, chief
of the Near Eastern department at the Soviet Foreign ministry,
arrived in Cairo for a four day visit. It was said that
Grinevskiy had sought an official invitation from Cairo but
the request was declined, rendering this an unofficial visit
[Ref. 24]
.
During Mubarak's September 1983 visit to Washington, the
Egyptian delegation felt there was a move to introduce some
doubt over the close U.S. - Egyptian relationship, specifically
with regards to an Egyptian-Romanian tank deal. The journalist
Ibrahim Sa'dah had accompanied the Egyptian delegation and
wired back his rejoinder to the attack he perceived in the
American press. He wrote:
"What is important is this interference by Israeli and
American spokesmen in a matter that is strictly an
Egyptian internal affair. Egypt is not a country in
the U.S. orbit and is not obliged to obtain prior
approval from the U.S. in its relations with other
countries, be they eastern or western .... It is true
that it has distinguished relations with the U.S....
while its relations with the Soviet Union... are cool
and have been almost frozen in the past years, but
this does not prevent Egypt from restoring its
relations with the Soviet Union to a normal state
should it find this beneficial to it and to its
people." [Ref. 25]
Less than a month later Mubarak was again criticizing the
Soviet Union for interfering in Egypt's domestic affairs:
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"...the latest manifestation of this interference [is]
their official comment on the recently held legislative
[Shura] elections ... they are still interfering in our
local affairs. When they stop this the ambassadors
will return, not before." [Ref. 26]
Egyptian officials began to publicly outline the direction
they felt the Soviet Union ought to take in promoting the
peace effort. They foresee the Soviet Union playing a poten-
tially constructive role in the region with some positive
steps. According to Al-Baz:
"The Soviet Union, through its contacts with the other
power, should give a certain priority to the Middle
East and should make clear to the U.S. that peace in
the Middle East is high on the agenda and it is as
important as the question of disarmament and nonpro-
liferation of arms." [Ref. 27]
In April 1984 Vladimir Polyakov, former Soviet ambassador
to Cairo, made an official visit to Cairo. During his extend-
ed four day visit he met with Al-Baz, Boutros-Ghali , and Abdel
Halim Badawi in discussing bilateral relations and the current
Middle East situation [Ref. 28]. Both sides seemed optimistic
following these talks. A month earlier, Mubarak had renewed
the trade exchange agreement between the two countries [Ref.
29]. A few days after Polyakov' s departure from Cairo, an
initial agreement was reached to exchange ambassadors, however
no dates for implementation were mentioned [Ref. 30]. A few
weeks later, Boutros-Ghali asserted that the exchange of
ambassadors between the two countries is only a procedural
decision [Ref. 31]. On 7 July 1984 both countries announced
without any fanfare the agreement to exchange ambassadors
between Cairo and Moscow.
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Boutros-Ghali commenting after the announcement said:
"... [it] came as a culmination of the phase which began
more than two years ago... [it] is a mere practical
application of the nonaligned policy... the real identity
of its foreign policy .. .Egypt ' s leadership in the Arab
world forces it to always have balanced relations with
the superpowers ... .The United States knows that for
Egypt to play its role in the region, it must have
relations with Moscow without these relations being
antagonistic with Washington." [Ref. 32]
The opposition parties in Egypt supported the government
by its approval of the impending ambassadorial exchange. Dr.
Walid Ra ' fat of the New Wafd party lauded the government's
decision stating that a balanced relationship between both
superpowers is a necessity and Moscow must respect Egypt's
sovereignty by not interfering in its internal affairs; of
course this is applicable to the United Stated also, he added
The Socialist Labor party's Ibrahim Shukri voiced a similar
view with the Wafd spokesman, adding "...I am certain that
sound and objective reasoning would not lead the United
States to think that deteriorating relations between Egypt
and the Soviet Union could be beneficial to her ties with
Egypt." The NPUG spokesman, Dr. Rif'at El-Said, hoped that
this is a positive step "which needs to be followed by more
steps until we reach a point of balance between the super-
powers." El-Umma party and its president, Ahmed El-Sabahi,
greeted the decision favorably adding that he is in complete
agreement with the Egyptian foreign policy. In addition,
Ismail Fahmy, former foreign minister 1974-77, commented
favorably on the exchange of ambassadors noting that severing
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or reduction of diplomatic representation with the big powers
is no longer a valid option in today's world. Moreover, Egypt
cannot carry its full weight and perform a positive role un-
less it held constant and balanced communication with both
superpowers. [Ref. 33]
A review of some Egyptian and Arab press reports in the
July-August period indicate the overlapping of several issues
and their effect on a country's mood toward the superpowers.
Al-Gomhouriya commenting on the Kuwait-Soviet arms deal says
that U.S. mistakes force the Arabs to turn to the Soviet Union,
"We do not go to Moscow willingly. The United States
always forces us to do" so. We are against communism
by nature, and we realize that Soviet arms are far
inferior to arms made in the west, but self-defense
necessitates that we go to Moscow as long as the U.S.
refuses to arm the Arabs ....
"U.S. mistakes are recurring in the region and they
continue, Israel and the Soviet Union are the first
to benefit from this, and the Arabs are and will
always be the losers unless they agree on a new and
unified armament and arms manufacturing policy." [Ref. 34]
The last statement was also aimed to help Egypt's emerging
arms industry. Similar views were expressed by Kamal Hassan
Ali, "If the United States does not meet the requests of the
Middle Eastern Arab states, then the Soviet Union will have a
golden opportunity." [Ref. 35]
The Socialist Labor party in its organ Al-Sha 'b questioned
why the national press was attacking or belittling the Soviet
Union, "Their papers either write apologetically about this
step [normalization] or try to depict it as insignificant."
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It also went on to say "Other articles proclaimed that the
Soviet Union has repented and atoned for its grave fascist
mistakes against us and therefore we have bestowed on it the
honor of resuming relations with it." [Ref. 36]
Ambassador Salah Basyuni was expected to leave for Moscow
the end of July to assume his new duties. The new ambassador
had served in a similar capacity in Addis Ababa and Hungary.
Shortly after his assignment in Moscow, Basyuni gave an unfor-
tunate telephone interview* in which he was quoted saying
"Arab solidarity will be the basis for dropping the Camp David
card." [Ref. 37] An official spokesman at the Egyptian
foreign ministry announced that these attributed statements
are incorrect and distorted and do not reflect the policies of
the Egyptian government [Ref. 38].
On September 24, the new Soviet ambassador, Alexander
Bolotogov, presented his credentials to the Egyptian president
along with five other new ambassadors thereby ending a three
year gap in that position. The relations during this period
concentrated on trade and economic relations between the two
countries. There were at times some accusations on both sides
of bad faith and interference in domestic affairs, but overall
it was a much quieter period than under Sadat's last four years
*It was indicated to the author while in Cairo that




The role of ideology was not a factor in the Egyptian
leadership's decision to normalize relations with the Soviet
Union. That is to say that there are not certain individuals
in the foreign policy decision-making process which have
Marxists leanings and for those reasons desired normalizations.
Instead state interests seem to have been the driving force in
the decision taken.
The following collection of views of prominent Egyptian
politicians will serve to illustrate. Moustapha Khalil,
former prime minister and head of foreign policy committee in
the ruling party: "I do not believe that ideology plays a
fundamental part at all in the process of formulating foreign
relations. Foreign policy is based first and foremost on in-
terests." [Ref. 39] Ismail Fahmy, former foreign minister
under Sadat, also asserts "...ideology has no place in politi-
cal activity and political action and in making grave political
decisions, whether these decisions have to do with peace or
war." [Ref. 39] The seasoned Moustapha Khalil added:
"The most important thing for Egypt is to preserve its
freedom of decision. If the course of Egyptian interests
runs parallel to the interests of any of the superpowers
and does not present any opposition to those interests,
there would be no harm in Egypt having relations with
this superpower .. .but to what extent could this relation-
ship develop so as not to be considered as subordination,
that is what must be considered." [Ref. 39 :p. 30]
Egypt, by upgrading its diplomatic representation with
the Soviet Union, is hoping to gain some influence over some
of the events happening in the region in addition to obvious
trade and economic benefits. Egypt is tied to Sudan with a
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joint defense treaty and considers the Sudan vital to Egypt's
economy, security and most importantly for its Nile water.
Cairo would like to reduce the external pressure Nimeiri has
been under lately, such as Libyan and Ethiopian aid to Sudan-
ese rebels. In addition, several anti-Nimeiri coups had
alledgedly been planned or attempted by Qadhafi or his sup-
porters in Sudan. To the east, Egypt would like Syria to be
more forthcoming in easing its verbal attacks on Egypt. Syria
has been the main force opposing Egypt's proposals to solve
the Palestinian problem. Therefore it is hoped in Cairo that
the Soviet Union will be able to influence some of its friends
in a region Egypt is influenced by and wishes to gain more
influence in.
Another dimension to this would be to exert some pressure
on the United States and Israel to actively participate in
solving the Palestinian issue. The Soviet Union has been en-
couraged to take positive actions to endorse the peace process
and Mubarak has called for a European initiative [Ref. 40] to
move the stalled process. Mubarak's call for a unified Arab
strategy with a successful Palestinian-Jordanian dialogue as
a first step can also be seen as additional pressure on
Washington to move on the peace process
.
One of Egypt's main goals in foreign policy is to bring
peace and stability to the region and this can only be reached
by solving the crux of the problem: the Palestinian problem.




(11 To change the realities on the ground by resorting to
conflict in order to improve the Arab's bargaining
position, forcing the superpowers to intervene. This
option is currently unavailable for Egypt and probably
not in the foreseeable future either [Ref. 41]. So
the Egyptian leadership really has just one option.
(2) To bring as much external pressure on the other side
that they are forced to act. This pressure would be
in the form of a unified Arab stand, a strongly en-
dorsed European initiative, a rallying of world
opinion, the backing of the nonaligned nations, uni-
lateral recognition of Israel by a unified PLO, and
bringing into the peace process the permanent members
of the UN security council. These measures, the
Egyptian leadership feels, would put pressure on
the American administration to convince Israel that
comprehensive peace is the only way to assure
security, stability and prosperity for all the
peoples of the region. This strategy's point of
departure is to believe in one's inherent ability
to influence the situation, and not be at the
mercy of external actors who may not have an in-
terest in chaning the status quo. The job won't
get done unless you do it yourself.
B. NONALIGNED MOVEMENT
"Nasser represented one stage in Egypt's life and
history with its own circumstances, decisions, needs,
and surrounding problems. He had his own style of runn-
ing the country's affairs. The circumstances at that
time necessitated that he follows a certain line.
Sadat's era was different from Nasser's era, and the
circumstances and requirements of that era dictated
a certain method of running the country's affairs.
We had had a setback and wanted war, and there was no
democracy, not to mention the other problems which
Sadat had to cope with. I have introduced a new style.
The war has ended and peace has been established...
Sadat's style was different from Nasser's. Everyone
has his own way of tackling the various issues... I do
things gradually. I am not one of those who believe
in solid blows or electric shocks." [Ref. 41 :p. 20]
The Mubarak era has brought with it Egypt's reassertion
of nonaligned policies as a fundamental guide in its foreign
policy. A study [Ref. 42] comparing Sadat's last seven months
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with Mubarak's first seven months, indicated that on only three
occasions did Sadat mention nonalignment in any of his speeches
These citations were only in passing and lacked significance.
By contrast Mubarak has been continuously advocating non-
alignment and has made it a key guiding principle in Egypt's
foreign policy. He has also discussed Egypt's leadership
role in the movement. In a speech he made to the joint legis-
lature in November 1981, Mubarak said,
"
. . .we adhere to the policy of nonalignment and positive
neutralism and call for the strengthening of the non-
aligned movement and ridding it of the blemishes from
which it has suffered in the last few years. These have
cost the unity which had existed among the member coun-
tries in their heyday, and shook many of the fundamental
beliefs on which their philosophy, procedure, and direc-
tion were established. And so, they have lost a great
deal of effectiveness and influence on the international
arena, and this phenomenon grieves us and we will work
on its removal for we believe that the path of nonalign-
ment is the preferred course which will realize the
interest of the peoples in freedom, security, and justice...
[and] Egypt is an Arab-African country, not eastern or
western .. .Egypt will not revolve in the orbit of any
state...." [Ref. 43]
A few months later, in celebration of the return of the
Sinai, Mubarak gave another speech to a joint session of the
legislature in which he emphasized nonalignment:
"
. . .we resist the international polarization phenomenon
and fight the policy of areas of influence which leads
to causing a serious flaw in the international system,
makes Third World peoples a mere instrument in the
conflict between the superpowers and exposes their
rights and interests to danger .. .Egypt will always
remain in the vanguard of the 'forces defending the
interests of peoples and human rights, calling for
adherence to international legitimacy and the rule of
law and seeking the establishment of a new international
system. ..." [Ref. 44]
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But this, Mubarak asserts, does not "preclude the establish-
ment of close relations with the European, American and other
states in the various fields." [Ref. 45]
It is clear that Mubarak and his foreign policy team set
out to bring Egypt back to the forefront of the nonaligned
movement and to correct what they saw as a deviation from the
movement's basic founding principles. This was one way for
the Egyptian leadership to regain some of its lost prestige
and influence in the Third World since 1979. This move could
also serve to reassert Egypt's independent judgement in its
foreign policy, which many states and Egyptians had questioned
during the last years under Sadat.
Ibrahim Naf i ' published a book on democracy in Egypt on
the eve of the May 1984 parliamentary elections. In it he
discusses election issues, party platforms and highlights the
"noble" efforts of the ruling party over the previous two and
a half years. A few pages at the end of the book deal with
foreign policy. Naf i ' here describes Egypt's international
credentials at the time Mubarak took power:
"Egypt... a 'stigma' within the nonaligned block was one
of the three states who founded and declared the move-
ment to the world. Accused of relinquishing the policies
of nonalignment , by aligning and submitting to one of
the superpowers .. .every nonaligned conference and meet-
ing witnessed vicious attempts to expel Egypt from the
movement." [Ref. 46]
Nafi' goes on to describe how Egypt's regional and inter-
national position has improved since Mubarak's assumption of
power. Egypt has regained its leadership position in the Arab
world and that it will not shirk on its Arab responsibilities
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and in defending the area from foreign dangers. Moreover,
"Egypt does not accept any interference in its national
political will, and refuses to be part of either superpowers*
strategy in the area." Naf i ' does on to cover Egypt's "dis-
tinguished" position on the African continent and at the
United Nation. [Ref. 46:pp. 124-132]
The Egyptian leadership has been trying to reduce the
tension in the Middle East and to solve the Palestinian prob-
lem which they believe to be the root of the instability.
This instability is an invitation to superpower regional in-
terference which they hope to reduce
.
"If the eastern and western camps adhere to the rules
of the game in Europe to avoid a clash between them,
they do not do so in the Middle East, which is still
in an unbalanced state and where the rules of the
international game are not yet clear," [Ref. 47]
comments Marshal Abu-Ghazalah
.
The Egyptian Marshal also provided a way out of this
international dilemma:
"[It is] due to the absence of an Arab will, which, if
it asserts itself, can neutralize all this. For this
reason I would say that the coming 10 years will be
the most critical period in the history of Arab security.
If the Arab nation wishes to live after the next 10
years its representatives must get together in order
to lay down the basis of a national Arab security and
a comprehensive Arab strategy." [Ref. 47]
This view suits the nonalignment posture adhered to by the
Egyptian political leadership, well as the Egyptian diplomat
Hafiz Ismail wrote "Egypt's solidarity with the Arab world is
one of the bases of its nonalignment...." [Ref. 48]
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Egypt believes that the Nonaligned movement cannot be a
static concept but it must make changes and amendments to
stay in harmony with changing international situations.
According to Nafi',
"...the essence of the policy of nonalignment has
changed ... [it ] used to be liberation and independ-
ence for countries under the yoke of imperialism,
and protection of the interests of Third World or,
more accurately, poor states."
"We now believe ... there is nothing to prevent any
nonaligned state from having special relations
with any superpower. We do not see this as a
violation of the concept of nonalignment." [Ref. 49]
Therefore the task of nonaligned states, according to Egypt,
has changed. Naf i ' suggests that this task is to "prevent
the proliferation of destructive weapons, bring an end to
nuclear armaments, and... to finance development projects in
the poor states...." [Ref. 49] Boutros-Ghali also sees the
movement's immediate task "is to make the necessary efforts
to ease the cold war and revive interest in a north-south
dialogue to promote a new and more just economic order."
[Ref. 50]
Mubarak in his United Nation General Assembly speech
[Ref. 51] of September 1983 emphasized the "international
economic crisis." For while the whole world was coming to
grips with this crisis, the Third World nations of the south
are struggling to survive. He advocated making structural
amendments to the existing monetary, finance, and trade
fields. He also made several proposals to outline a north-
south dialogue. This reflects Egypt's desire to formulate
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the nonaligned agenda items with emphasis on north-south
dialogue and economic development while shifting somewhat
from the removal of the "imperial yoke" days.
Egypt has also been very interested in regaining its van-
guard role in Africa. The African bloc could play a more
active and influential role within the nonaligned movement.
Ghali believes that "Egypt's future is in Africa because
there is more real room for Egypt's expertise in Africa than
in the Arab states. Egypt's food security is in Africa, not
in the Arab states, with the exception of Iraq...." [Ref. 52]
So Africa provides Egypt with increased political influence
and can serve to eliminate its dependence on extra-regional
food imports . Ghali has personally conducted negotiations
with Addis Ababa in the hope of harmonizing its relations
with its neighbors, and Egypt's allies, Sudan and Somalia.
Returning to the political aspect of nonalignment , one
should not conclude that they are dreamers or idealists in
Cairo, as Abu-Ghazalah mentions:
"We realize that we are living in a world in which
various interests are in conflict with each other,
and where matters sometimes come to the point of
a clash. However, we just as firmly believe that,
no matter what conflicts exist, the possibility of
reaching an understanding and solving disputes is
always a possibility which is larger and more
important than the possibility of war and destruction."
[Ref. 53]
Perhaps this excerpt of an Al-Ahram article following the
normalizing of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union
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best depict the reality of the international system and its
effect on small and mid-size states :
"...a small country like Egypt, while seekinq to defend
its interests and restore if only part of the Arab
rights in conditions of total Arab collapse, could not
afford to maintain an absolutely equal balance in deal-
ing with the two superpowers . Putting theories and
slogans aside, practical necessities make it incumbent
upon every country in today's world to be inclined
toward this or that side in its relations with the
superpowers to preserve its national interests and
objectives in conditions of international polarization
that cannot be ignored. However, a successful foreign
policy is one that is capable of preventing relations
with any country, particularly the superpowers, from
reaching the point of breakdown and the withdrawal of
ambassadors while, on the other hand preventing special
relations with anybody reaching a degree of tutelage
and blind obedience. This is what the policy of non-
alignment requires, the policy to which Egypt is
committed and which calls for a good degree of under-
standing with the two giants." [Ref. 54]
Academians [Ref. 55], diplomats [Ref. 48], and scores of
press articles have called for a more active role in non-
aligned circles by Eqypt and the need to reassess the poli-
cies of the second Sadat term within the current international
milieu. Government officials have asserted that Egypt is not
an ally but a friend of the United States [Ref. 56], and that
the U.S. needs qood friends and not allies in the region. The
Egyptian officials reason that a strong (domestically and
militarily) and influential Egypt that is a friend of the U.S.
is far more stable than an allied Egypt, regionally and inter-
nationally isolated and ripe for internal strife.
There is a desire within Egyptian official circles and
the educated elite for Egypt to regain the degree of
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influence and leadership in the Arab world that they once
enjoyed [Ref. 57]. As Egypt began to emerge from its rela-
tive isolation and regain its international credentials it
also began to reassert its leadership role in the Arab world.
At times this was done almost apologetically, as when Kamal
Hassan Ali said in late 1982,
"Egypt does not want leadership, but our situation and
our fate impose on us certain commitments which we carry
out honestly and sincerely. Hence, the Egyptian role
in supporting the Arab homeland as a whole. Events
have proved this . Egvpt has shouldered and continues
to shoulder the battle for peace. Eqypt [is qualified]
to carry out a responsible role-- and I do not say a
leadership role." [Ref. 58]
At other times Ali had called for close coordination between
Saudi Arabia and Egypt since that will bring positive results
on the region, and would combine the two most important
states in the region [Ref. 59]. Ali's comments were a reply
to a popular Egyptian view which states that Saudi Arabia
has been halting progress in Egypt's return to the Arab world
On the other hand, Safwat Al-Sharif the minister of state
for information and long-time close friend of Mubarak reiter-
ated a dominant and emerging feeling on Egypt's regional role
when he highlighted major items in a Mubarak speech. Accord-
ing to the minister, Mubarak said,
"We give boundlessly for the sake of our Arab nation
and the Palestinian cause. We may not be giving
financial support, but, on the other hand, we have
our culture and capabilities that place us at the
forefront. That Egypt will remain the leading state
in the region whether some like it or not." [Ref. 60]
75
It seems that the Egyptian leadership has been taking
some advice from some of the former foreign ministry officials
in formulating their foreign policy strateqy. Ismail Fahmy
who served Sadat as foreign minister for three years but
resigned over the Jerusalem trip were among many who became
very critical of Egyptian foreign policies during the summer
of 1982. He, like many, linked Israeli actions in Lebanon
to an overall American strategy in the region. He also saw
Egypt's inability to influence events in its region as a con-
sequence of its uneven relationship with the United States .
He proposed the following course for the Egyptian leadership:
"To be effective Egypt must regain its strength and
political power.... A genuine Egypt should not just
repeat slogans and indulge in rhetoric .. .Egvpt is
completely different from the Arab world in its
ability, illumination and control of the course of
events , and also in its power to maintain a con-
structive balance. Egypt is the only country in
this strategic part of the world that can play the
game of nations well. This is why Egypt must build
complete bridges with the Arab world ... [and] restore
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Israel
and the great powers would take account of an Egvpt
full of vitality and strength ... [then] it will
definitely be able to directly influence events in
the region." [Ref. 61]
Egypt's more independent line with the United States, its
reassertion of the nonaligned principles in its foreign
policy and the return of the Soviet ambassador to Cairo should
all be analyzed in Egypt's desire to serve its national in-
terests first and foremost being security, immediately
followed by economic conditions and the desire to restoring
its freedom of movement. In the next chapter we will discuss




VI . MILITARY RELATIONS
"It is indisputable that Egypt is the largest
country in the Arab region, in North Africa and
also in the western corner of Asia. Egypt's geo-
graphical location and its position in the balance
of international powers are extremely sensitive.
There is no doubt that nothing is being given to
Egypt for Egypt's sake. Egypt is the significant
indredient that chancres the balance in the scales
because its strategic position in the region
carries clout. On that basis Egypt may be courted;
that is indisputable. Therefore, there has to be
a relationship." [Ref. 1]
Egypt's military relationship with the United States can
best be analyzed within- Egypt ' s developing concept of its
national security needs. Egypt has been committed to a strong
defense capability which would facilitate the pursuit of its
national interest in a sometime hostile, or non-permissive,
environment. For the Egyptian elite, politics is indeed
about power, and military force continues to be a central
component of power.
Egypt's rising population (estimated at 47 million in
1984), at the rate of one million every 10 months, is a con-
stant drain on Egypt's limited resources. Also the govern-
ment's decision to maintain a large standing militarv force
(approximately 450,000)* commensurate with the country's
*Breakdown in 1983, Army: 320,000; Air Defense Forces
80,000; Air Force: 27,000; and Navy: 20,000. (Source:
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 August 1983) .
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regional political leadership has meant Soviet military aid;
while Sadat relied on the countries of the Arabian Peninsula
to financially support his eastern and western arm purchases .
After Camp David, Sadat could only rely on the United States
and to a lesser extent on France to provide weapons and
financing of his armed forces
.
Bv switchina from eastern bloc weapons, and all the doc-
trinal baggage involved, to western ones Sadat had to rely
on the leader of that bloc, the United States. Due to the
size of his armed forces and the quantities involved, only
one of the superpowers could afford to resupply Egypt in the
post-1973 war. Naturally some Western European countries like
France, Italy, and Britain in addition to China and North
Korea were willing to conduct gap-filling duties for the
needs of the Egyptian military, but never in sufficient quan-
tities. Sadat wanted the symbolism associated with establish-
ing a militarv relationship with the United States. In 1976
the sale of six C-130 transport aircraft to Egypt broke a
twenty-year arms sale embargo to Egypt. By the end of 1981,
Egypt had received or contracted to receive medium battle
tanks, armed personnel carriers, sophisticated fighter air-
craft, and missies from the United States. Sadat had suc-
ceeded in bringing the U.S. into a military relationship with
Egypt
.
This relationship has developed further under Mubarak and,
like his predecessor, has included large joint exercises
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codenamed -- Brigh.t Star. These joint maneuvers were con-
ducted in 19,80., 1981, and 1983. In addition, a joint U.S. -
Egyptian naval exercise "Sea Winds" involving major elements
of the U.S. 6th fleet was conducted in early November 1984
[Ref. 2]. In one of the three phases of this exercise, the
American aircraft carrier simulated an aggressor role with
its organic assets while the Egvptian Air Defense Forces and
the Air Force defended the homeland. A year earlier the
Egyptian Navy had held joint maneuvers with the British Royal
Navy
.
Since Sadat's death, Egypt has received 40 advanced F-16
fighter aircraft [Ref. 3] and has another 40 (to include C/D
versions) on order. An agreement in principal has been signed
for a total of 150 of these General Dynamics aircraft. Egypt
still maintains about 35 F-4E fighters delivered in 1979.
Four Grumman E-2C airborne early warning aircraft are ex-
pected to enter the Egyptian Air Force between 1985-1987. The
Egyptian army and Air Defense Forces have also been recipients
of U.S. weapons. These include 1,100 armed personnel carriers,
and over 439 M-60-A3 battle tanks. Twelve Improved Hawk
surface-to-air missile batteries are expected in country by
the end of 1984, with four additional batteries on order.
Another air defense system expected before year's end is the
"Skyguard" (dubbed 'Amun' in Egypt) using AIM-7M sparrow
missiles and twin barrel 35mm antiaircraft guns. This system
is expected to be operational by April 1985.
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The United States, constitutes the major arms supplier to
Egypt. However, Cairo tried to diversity its arms sources as
much as possible. At the end of 1979, then defense minister
Kamal Hassan Ali stated that Egypt realizes the difficulty
in logistics, maintenance, and training with such an arms
diversification policy but that it was necessary in order not
to repeat the post 1973 arms dependence experience [Ref . 4]
.
Within this context of diversifying arm suppliers, Egypt con-
cluded the Mirage-200Q fighter/bomber deal with France in
January of 1982. This deal had been initiated almost two
years earlier under Sadat. Abu-Ghazalah, in an interview,
had indicated his desire for U.S. military aid to Egypt to
be increased. He added that what the U.S. gives Egypt is
still limited and this is what prompted Egypt to conclude the
Mirage deal with France [Ref. 5] . In the same vein, on
Mubarak's first visit to Western Europe since assuming power,
the Egyptian national press carried headlines of promised arm
sales to Egypt from Italy to include torpedo boats, helicopters
and air defense systems [Ref. 6] . The press had a duty to
portray the new president's first trip abroad to be a success.
France has also provided about 45 Alpha-Jet aircraft as an
advance jet trainer, some of these are ground support/strike
confiqured. Egyot has been assembling 100% of the aircraft
locallv with some parts locally produced. Egypt expects to
manufacture about 15% of the Mirage-2000. A similar produc-
tion - assembly deal (85% local production) was consummated
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with Brazil for the EMB-312 Tucano basic training aircraft.
China has also provided the Egyptian Air Force with Chinese
versions of Soviet Mig-19. and Mig-21 (F-6 and F-7) , and
these are also locally assembled in Egyptian factories
.
These measures have been a steady and conscious effort on the
Defense ministry to bring advance western technology to the
Egyptian military with the desire to have some civilian in-
dustrial fallout. Co-production has been Abu-Ghazalah '
s
theme for several years now as he tries to modernize the
military and establish an indigenous arms industry. [Ref. 7]
The Egyptian Navy had not received the same priority as
the other services until recently. Britain, China, and Spain
have all delivered surface units to the Navy over the past
three years. China has added two more submarines to the
Egyptian inventory. In addition the United States and Britain
have provided some assistance to the ongoing Egyptian effort
to increase the longevity of Soviet weapons in the service
.
The second Cairo International Defense convention was
held in November 1984 and included 380 international arms
manufacturers belonging to 19 countries . Egypt participated
with 15 of its national arms manufacturers . The aim is to
break into the Arab and African markets and to find financial
support in developing the Egyptian arms industry, this would
provide Cairo a dependable foreign currency earner. [Ref. 8]
Concurrent with the arms convention, the third African
military conference was held in Cairo. Twenty-two African
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states, including Egypt participated in the conference. It
lasted three days and discussed African military thought and
strategy, military needs and coordination to achieve common
goals. The first such conference was held in October 1980
while the second was held in Cairo in May 1982 and included
12 states. [Ref. 9]
It should be evident from the above cursory description of
Egyptian arms procurement and production desires that it is a
massive financial, maintenance and training endeavor. Yet,
the Egyptian leadership have continually advocated the diver-
sification policy of procurement and the goal of absorbing
as much western technology as the western powers will provide.
Even the Egyptian Air Force Academy is changing its curricula
along the lines of the U.S. Air Force Academy in its effort
to switch from a Soviet to a western system and philosophy
according to Abdel Hamid Hilmi, the EAF ' s commandant [Ref. 10]
The financial burden is massive and hence U.S. military aid --
about $3.6 billion in Mubarak's first three years -- becomes
a major source of financing.
The picture which emerges then is of a country with an
active foreign policy strongly endorsing and adhering to non-
aligned principles while costlv modernizing its military
forces. Egypt's regional role requires a strong and credible
Egyptian military, to be achieved with emphasis on quality,
not quantity, according to Abu-Ghazalah [Ref. 11] . To meet
its military needs, Egypt has turned to the U.S., and at
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times Sadat felt the U.S. could be more forthcoming {Ref. 12],
also France and to lesser extent Britain, Italy with West
Germany as a potential co-production partner. Its dealings
with Romania, China and Yugoslavia have not been to acquire
state-of-the-art equipment but those that are compatible with
already existing eastern systems. This would increase these
system's life actinq as a gap-filler until the turnover to
western arms and technology is completed by the early 1990s.
The experience gained by Egyptian military industries in
reverse engineering and assembly of its Soviet weapon systems
would make it attractive to other Third World states in pro-
viding them technical and maintenance services . In addition
these could be potential buyers of the excess Egyptian-modi-
fied eastern bloc arms. Therefore, Egypt's weapon source
diversification currently includes both eastern and western
sources, however, in advanced technoloqy and electronics the
diversification is only within the western bloc. Egypt's
long-term strategy places the west as the fundamental supplier
of the most advanced systems while Egypt hopes to supplement
its needs with local production from its arms industry [Ref.
13] .
In the military field, we can then say that Egypt under
Mubarak is maintaining a special relation with the United
States. This is a direct extension of Sadat's policies and
desires since 1974. It is interesting to note that when the
mini-crisis of the Red Sea - Gulf of Suez mines occurred in
83
August 1984, that Mubarak first called on the United States
for rainehunting and sweeping services. These forces eventual-
ly included French-, British and Italian minesweeping units.
With regards to diversification of weapon suppliers, this
policy also goes back to the Sadat era and the military lead-
ership who wanted to cease relying on only one source for its
armament and spare part needs
.
The Egyptian leadership is trying to achieve its security
needs within three fundamental principles. First, the need
to pacify and resolve conflicts in the area in a manner that
will prevent their exploitation by any power that could jeo-
pardize its interests. Secondly, the need to possess the
strength as a means to deter any power from seeking to
threaten Egypt militarily, economically, or politically.
Finally, the need to achieve Arab solidarity that will guaran-
tee higher Arab interests and unify strategic vision. [Ref. 14]
Under the above canopy, we note Egypt's desire to keep the
region out of the cold war arena as much as possible. To
eliminate regional pacts and exes as they only serve to force
a counterpact or alliance which may very well pit one super-
power against the other. In order for the region to enjoy any
type of stability, the countries in the area must come to
terms with each other. Egypt has been advocating defense of
the area by local forces and hence the United States is asked
to arm the Arab countries to be able to carry out the defense
of their homeland. The call for Arab solidarity would include
84
a unified security policy with, the Egyptian armed forces
acting as an Arab, and not only an Egyptian, deterrent force.
Keeping in ir.ond Egypt's continued need to extract re-
sources from its environment (regional and global), in order
to meet its defense and development plans, we must consider
to whem the above security strategy is aimed. The United
States in one, while the other is Saudi Arabia and to a lesser
extent the Gulf mini-states. On the global level the United
States is the major arms producer and provides financial
facilities, in addition to the leverage it is perceived to
have over Israel -- the only serious security threat to Egypt
in the area. On the regional level, Saudi Arabia could pro-
vide Egypt with what it lacks most -- financial capital .
Mubarak has been making great efforts at rapprochement with
Saudi Arabia, and has been keen on not fueling Saudi fear of
any latent Egyptian regional hegemony.
Mubarak has put his economy as the primary problem facing
his country [Ref. 15]. In order for him to deal with the
economy and modernize his armed forces in a country whose
population is increasing unabatedly, Mubarak needs stability
— domestic and regional. The United States could and has
provided aid for both programs, economy and military, however,
Mubarak is not willing to put all his eggs in one basket and
has sought to tap the Saudis for aid by his reaffirmation of
Egypt's Arabism in words and deeds.
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Let us. now examine some of the pressing military issues
during the period under study involving Egypt and the United
States and indirectly the states of the region and the Soviet
Union. While we have concluded that there were no basic
changes in the Egyptian military strategy since Sadat, it is
important to note how the current leadership has handled some
of the major issues and the impact of its role conception.
Two basic issues will be addressed, the topic of granting
facilities and the joint Bright Star exercises. Domestic
reaction on these issues will illuminate the regime's avail-
able options in dealing on these sensitive issues . The reali-
zation of the interlocking and overlapping forces at the
domestic, regional and global levels in such issues will fur-




In Agust of 1981, Sadat in an interview declared that the
"era of the establishment of military bases in Egypt or other
countries in the world has ended and that this a remnant of
the old colonialist rule." [Ref. 16] This comment was made
at a time when Egypt was offering the facilities at Ra ' s Banas
naval and air base on the Red Sea for use by the United States
Sadat saw the American interest in the base and Egypt in a
positive sense. This would further secure Egypt to the
United States, their strategic view in the region and the
world becomes identical. Sadat would be able to successfully
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compete with Israel for American favors. Sadat later in the
interview added that Egypt has more strategic importance than
Is.rael, and that it also has the capacity to provide military
assistance to any Arab country during an emergency situation
— something that Israel cannot do. Additionally, Sadat
wanted the United States to rearm Egypt in order to defend
itself and "protect Saudi Arabia if need be." [Ref. 16] In
Sadat's strategy, Egypt would receive American arms at a
speedier rate on the one hand by showing its willingness to
defend the Gulf oil areas and the other by providing the U.S.
facilities on the Red Sea. Rumors circulating in Egypt at
the time related to how Sadat would not even mind joining
NATO.
Sadat wanted to solve his internal economic problems, he
had already lost Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti support, and so
the United States was his only hope. He also wanted to secure
any threats to his country. The Peace Treaty with Israel was
one way to secure Egypt's most powerful and histroical adver-
sary and a close relationship with the U.S. would add to that
security on the eastern front. Regarding his western borders,
Sadat never really seriously considered Libya a direct threat
in the same sense as Israel, but one that can cause political
unrest and not a military defeat. The Aden Friendship Treaty
of 1981 between Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen did bother
the Egyptian military due to the pressure it places on Sudan
— Egypt's ally and strategic depth, and the Soviet Union was
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seen as. the main instigator of the pact iRef . 17] . By drawing
closer to the U.S., Sadat hoped to minimize his external
threats whether they be from the east, west or the south and
also to receive the type and quantity of economic aid which
only the United States could make available.
Back in early 19.80 a few weeks after the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, then Vice-president Mubarak made a trip to
Washington to discuss weapon procurement, the Palestinian
problem and to establish basic principles on Egyptian-American
cooperation. The basic agreed upon principles for future
cooperation were: first, the Arab states would defend them-
selves and that Egypt will come to the aid of those request-
ing assistance -- with the Gulf states at the forefront.
Facilities would be provided to the U.S. if the need arose,
these would be temporary, and conditional in nature and only
for the defense of the Gulf and Arab interests and dependent
on a request by the local governments. Secondly, Egypt does
not desire an American military presence on her soil. Thirdly,
Egypt with increased capabilities and training, will be able
to meet all possibilities and the aid of other countries.
These were the building blocks for subsequent negotiations on
Ra's Banas . These facilities were to be used to redress the
balance in the region following Afghanistan. [Ref. 18]
The government faced some domestic opposition in 1981 on
the role of facilities. According to Mumtaz Nassar, the
opposition leader in the People's Assembly, he does not see a
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difference between bases and facilities. "Military facilities
in the modern sense are merely mobile bases. Bases and
facilities will involve us in problems of conflict between
the two superpowers in our area...." He did not feel it
necessary to bring the U.S. to the defense of the area "The
security of Egypt and of the area can be achieved only by the
hands of its own people.... It is the sons of the area alone
who can fill any security vacuum in the area." [Ref. 20]
Boutros-Ghali , in August of 1983, reiterated four condi-
tions in order to offer temporary facilities for the United
States [Ref. 2] ]
:
(1) If any aggression takes place on an Arab country.
(2) If this Arab country asks the help of the U.S.
(3) If the U.S. agrees to the request.
(4) Egypt has the right to offer or not offer any
facilities for the U.S. troops to help that country.
One major difference between this policy and that espoused
under Sadat is condition number four. This provides Egypt
with more control over the facilities and troop movements
.
It also demonstrates that Mubarak does not share identical
American strategic view in the region. Under Sadat, Egyptian
and American regional analyses were quite similar, so much so
that Sadat had not provided Egypt with the procedural mechanism
to control the use of the facilities. None would be needed,
was the conclusion, for if the U.S. perceives a threat, Egypt
would also perceive the threat in similar terms.
89
One also notices, how. the current Egyptian leadership is
emphasizing defense of the area by the local armies and mini-
mizing the facilities argument. Kamal Hassan Ali explains,
"The Gulf states are relying on themselves ... [they ] have asked
the United States solely for arms, and not for intervention."
[Ref. 22] In addition Egypt was put in an uncomfortable
position due to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
Abu-Ghazalah had expressed his views on bases and facilities
in the region in an interview when he added, "How can the
Arabs give the U.S. any facilities in the area when up to now
it has no definite stand on the Palestinian problem. .. .The
Arabs may give the U.S. such facilities if it solves the
Palestinian problem." [Ref. 23] In the Egyptian leadership's
mind, in the wake of the Lebanon experience, it has become
more costly to deal with the United States at the level that
both had desired. Moreover, Ra's Banas and the whole facili-
ties issue could be perceived by Egypt as enhanced bargaining
power in its attempt to regain its regional stature by pro-
moting a comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem
with American help.
Let us examine how the more independent domestic press has
perceived the differences between Sadat and Mubarak to be on
the topic of the United States and military facilities. The
popular Rose El-Youssef weekly suggests in ar article in June
of 1984 Sadat's likely responses to the escalating war in the
Gulf and the threat to the oil facilities would have been
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markedly different from Mubarak's. The article suggests that
the U.S. would demand to project its Rapid Deployment Force
to the region in order to halt Iranian activities; followed
by Egypt placing its bases under American command as another
means of facilitating the effort. Egypt would also suggest
the other Arab countries to do the same for the U.S., and
those that refuse shall be labeled agents of Moscow. Finally,
Egypt should also provide forces to stop the Iranian threat.
[Ref. 24]
Mubarak's efforts during this period on the other hand
were praised by the magazine, "...Egypt tried to contain the
problem and protect the region from foreign interference....
This is our national policy and of nonalignment which Mubarak
has applied since his announcement of it when he assumed
power, without clamor or fanfare." [Ref. 24 :p. 21] One could
argue that the article was unfair to Sadat and possibly did
not depict him in the proper light. However, more important
here is the perception expressed in the article and shared by
much of the Egyptian elite and masses. We have already indi-
cated that Mubarak has not changed much in the basic terms
regarding facility usage. But due to other concurrent actions,
within the nonaligned group, the Arab world and the elimina-
tion of personalized politics, Mubarak has appeared more
nationalistic, not a puppet to either superpower and is per-
ceived to have radically changed some of Sadat's policies in
its military relations with the United States.
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In a somewhat related topic, according to Ahu-Ghazalah
,
on the eve of Sadat's assassination Egypt had a policy of not
sending troops outside Egypt unless Sudan is subjected to a
foreign invasion [Ref. 25] . The international Arab weekly Al-
Majalla in May of 1983 indicated that the United States had
wanted Egypt to send military experts to Chad to support the
Habre regime. None were sent. The American side, the maga-
zine claims, believed that had Sadat been alive he would have
immediately dispatched his experts to Chad {Ref. 26]
.
B. JOINT EXERCISES
Egypt's military relations with the United States has
also included joint military exercises. The first of these -
Bright Star -- was in November 1980 in the Egyptian desert.
The second exercise shortly followed Sadat's assassination in
November 1981. These had usually included not more than
1,500 U.S. troops, were conducted during daylight hours, and
occurred in the fall to avoid the intense desert heat. The
exercises were not conducted in 1982 due to the Lebanese
situation, however, they were on again in August of 1983.
This latest exercise involved more U.S. troops (approximately
5,500) , was longer in duration, and was conducted during the
hottest period of the year. Also, there was an increase in
the aerial platforms used, and some night time exercises were
held. [Ref. 27]
Mubarak and the Egyptian leadership have taken great pain
in assuring their neighbors that these exercises are not
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designed against any state in particular fRef. 28]. On
another occasion Mubarak said, "We are a small country and
we benefit from extensive and varied experiences of the U.S.
Army. Such maneuvers benefit all of us. They have bene-
fited and they have admitted this and so did we...." [Ref.
29] Kamal Hassan Ali has also voiced his support of these
exercises since they increase the knowledge and efficiency
of the Egyptian unit commanders [Ref. 30].
The Egyptian military since 1967 had been working on im-
proving its moral, feeling that with modern equipment and
intensive training, the Egyptian military can regain confi-
dence [Ref. 31] . These joint exercises also serve along
that continuous goal. Abu-Ghazalah , following the second
joint exercise in 1981 summed up Egypt's benefits as follows
[Ref. 32]
:
(1) Egyptian forces' ability to cooperate with the forces
of another state has been established. Hence coopera-
tion with friendly Arab armies will not be a problem.
(2) The Egyptian soldier has become conficent that his
efficiency is equal to the U.S. soldier.
(3) The Egyptian soldier now has great confidence in the
weapons he is using after comparing it with his
American counterpart.
(4) The Egyptian forces have become confident in their
combat capability and their potential for excellent
planning and implementation.
These are concrete and tangible benefits which the Egyptian
military leadership hopes to continue to gain from these
exercises .
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In a column in Ashara Al-Awsat
,
pertinent comments of an
analysis, of U.S. - Egyptian exercises by Zbigniew Brzezinski
were printed. He is quoted to have forwarded three lessons
on the U.S. - Egyptian relations in view of the exercises.
First, there is a large storage of Egyptian nationalism and
an acute sensitivity to any foreign military presence on
Egyptian soil which may be construed to be permanent. Second-
ly, the U.S. should not believe that its interests and Egypt's
national interests to be toally identical, and therefore the
U.S. will make a grave error if it deals with Egypt as an
American state. Finally and more importantly, he says that
any alliance between the U.S. and any Arab regime will not
be permanent or solid and will not have popular legitimacy
as long as the Palestinian problem remains unresolved.
[Ref. 33]
These joint military maneuvers came under great criticism
by the opposition in the press. Their rejection of the
exercises was generally based on U.S. ties with Israel who
the opposition feel is a more direct threat to Egyptian se-
curity and the Arab world than the Soviet Union, and a feel-
ing of having a dependency on or being a lackey of the United
States [Ref. 34], Others attacked Egypt's declared peace
strategy since it was not tied to American global strategy
[Ref. 35]. The current regime was accused of allowing Egypt-
ian territory to be a proving round for U.S. weapons, and a
launchpad for interference in the affairs of the Arab and
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Islamic countries [Ref . 36J . Some went so far as to accuse
the government of being naive for allowing the U.S. to ex-
ploit it; Egypt needs a policy independent of Washington,
they asserted [Ref. 37]. "President Mubarak's pledge that
Egypt would never be a part of any superpower strategy is
still a wish divorced from reality," [Ref. 37] claimed the
opposition press
.
By the end of July 1984, the Egyptian Navy had accepted
15 new units into the service that year [Ref. 11], and were
expecting more by year's end. This is part of a program to
modernize and increase the capabilities of the Navy and would
be a first step along the road to making the Red Sea an Arab
lake [Ref. 5]. The Egyptian Navy had held joint exercises
with the British Royal Navy and the latest one "Sea Winds"
was with the U.S. 6th fleet which also involved Egyptian Air
Defense Forces. These exercises were strongly supported by
the respective Egyptian military services [Ref. 2]. Also,
the manner in which the announcement was made, at a military
ceremony commemorating the Egyptian Navy, a week in advance
would indicate that the leadership truly believes these ex-
ercises to be beneficial to Egypt and worth the domestic and
regional opposition it will attract. Some were surprised
about "Sea Winds" since the "Bright Star" exercises were
not held in 1984, and expected these joint exercises to
disappear. Opposition to the latest exercise did come from
the popular Ashara Al-Awsat editorial board [Ref. 38].
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Egypt's military relationship under Mubarak has not de-
viated in its basic structure. Egypt and the west, espec-
ially the U.S., do enjoy a "special" military relationship.
Mubarak has provided more sovereign control over use of the
country's facilities while emphasizing defense of the region
by the Arab military, without foreign interference. In the
quest to modernize the military and maintain a high level
of moral and readiness, the leadership has looked with favor
to the United States and its capabilities in order to achieve
these goals. In a press article, Dr. Mohamed Ismail Ali
presents some advice to the government, he suggests keeping
foreign policy along the straight path, because "results of
polarization to the left were clear on 5 June [1967], while
results of polarization to the right were clear on 5 Septem-
ber [1981] ." [Ref . 39]
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VI I . ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS
The internal domestic front has been the pressing issue
in Egypt, certainly since Mubarak's assumption of power, with
the economy being its Achilles' heel. The population is in-
creasing at a faster than desired rate -- 2.8% annually
[Ref. 1], or one million new additions every ten months,
reaching 47 million inhabitants on only 4% of the land in
1984 . Meanwhile agricultural production is growing at an
annual rate of only 2% [Ref. 2]. Estimates of Egypt's for-
eign debts range from the World Bank's $17,300 million to
the Bank of International Settlements' $21,800 million.
Total government subsidies at present, cost the government
an estimated $7,000 million a year [Ref. 3]. By Third World
standards, Egypt's economic problems are not severe and
could be rectified, but with some hard and politically un-
popular decisions [Ref. 4], At least until that stage is
reached, Egypt will continue to depend on external capital
injections to its economy, whether it be Arab, western,
eastern, or a combination thereof.
So how does the current leadership's actions in the realm
of economic and trade compare with the Sadat regime, as they
reflect foreign policy orientations? We will present in this
chapter the economic trends observed during the past three
years and any deviations from the prior policies . A brief
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outline of Egypt's economic woes shall suffice to present
the reader with the existing constraints on external politi-
cal choices of Mubarak, or any future heir in the near future.
Both the prime minister [Ref. 5] and the foreign minister
[Ref. 6 J have given economic development precedence in poli-
tical decisions
.
Mubarak has not made any fundamental changes to Sadat's
economic policy — the Open Door -- of 1974 (Law 43) . This
economic liberalization plan which envisioned Egyptian labor
+ western technology + Arab capital producing economic pros-
perity came under domestic attack by the end of the seventies
and before Sadat's assassination [Ref. 7]. Sadat had esca-
lated popular expectations of prosperity as a result of
peace with Israel and the virtual alliance with the United
States. Unrestricted consumerism of the seventies brought
a new class of "Fat Cats" with dubious social values and a
general sense that the burdens of the time are now shared
more unequally than ever before. Overnight millionaires
became heroes to emulate, regardless of how unscrupulous were
the means
.
The increasing religiosity during this time could be ex-
plained in part as a reaction to the newly developing social
conditions in Egypt. The ties to the United States came
under great criticism by nationalists, leftists, and religious
groupsing. It was over such conditions that Mubarak found
himself presiding in October of 1981. He opted not to change
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the Economic Open Door Policy (EODP) but to redirect it and
change it from a consumer oriented EODP to a production
oriented one. In addition, a five-year economic plan was
drawn to guide future investments and provide tangible goals
to articulated economic concepts; the rolling yearly budgets
and plans of the late seventies would no longer suffice.
Mubarak could not afford to dismantle his predecessor's
economic apparatus, had he wanted to. He saw the plan to be
basically sound but needs to be more in step with the nation-
al goals. In Mubarak's first cabinet of 4 January 1982, the
deputy prime minister for economic affairs, Ali Abdel-Rassaz
Abdel-Meguid, was replaced by Abdel-Fattah Ibrahim. The form-
er deputy prime minister had come under a series of criticism
in the summer of 1981 for a series of haphazardly introduced
economic measures. The timing of the cabinet reshuffle
seemed also to coincide with the ongoing corruption case
against businessman Rashad Osman, in which Abdel-Meguid '
s
name was mentioned in court. Also brought into the economic
team were Mohamed Salaheddin Hamed, minister of Finance and
Kamal Ahmed El-Ganzouri, minister of Planning.
In September of 1982 another cabinet reshuffle was taken,
confirming the notion that the earlier January reshuffle was
a stop-gam measure. Hamed, and El-Ganzouri retained their
portfolios with newcomers being: Moustapha Kamel Said, mini-
ster of Economy and Foreign Trade; and Wagih Shindi as mini-
ster of Investment and International Co-operation who
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replaced Abdel Fattah Ihrahim. This cabinet lasted nearly
two years -- indicating Mubarak's stress on stability -- un-
til July of 1984, following the May legislature elections.
Wagih Shindi was shifted to Tourism and Civil Aviation; the
Investment Affairs ministry was disbanded, and the Invest-
ment Authority brought under the aegis of the Planning mini-
stry. Hence, El-Ganzouri ' s role in the economic team has
been greatly elevated given Mubarak's emphasis on planning
and foreign investment. Additionally, the newly formed
higher investment committee headed by Prime Minister Kamal
Hassan Ali, has announced new procedures designed to stream-
line investment. The Investment Authority has been empowered
to give provisional approval for a project the same day it
is submitted, with final approval within 60 days. In theory
the reorganizations should speed up and facilitate foreign
investment, a key Mubarak goal, however time will -tell.
Key entires of Egypt's current budget appears in Table 1
to help elucidate the country's current economic situation.
Direct subsidies loom large in the budget representing 16%
of the total revenues. When indirect subsidies (energy sub-
sidies) are taken into account, the total subsidy bill be-
comes nearly 39% of the country's total revenues. These
subsidies offset the hard currency income provided from
worker's remittances and oil sales. Mubarak's economic team
hopes to reduce the percentage of subsidies as they relate
to the gross domestic product (GPD) . Growth is put at about
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7.5% a year while the rate of inflation is estimated between
15-20%.
Oil revenues represent less than 10% of total revenues
in Egypt, this is despite production of nearly one million
barrels a day. Of the expected production of 45 million tons
in 19.84/85, approximately half will be consumed locally at a
greatly subsidized price. The net Suez Canal revenues in
the current budget represent a decline over 1983/84. This
only represents over two percent of the country's revenue.
However, Suez Canal dues do provide badly needed hard cur-
rency for the government which are reflected in its current
account
.
The average annual growth in imports between 1972-1981
was 43.1% while the average annual growth in exports was 26%
in the same period. If we do not include oil revenues, the
exports growth percentage would shrink to 11.2% [Ref . 8]
.
Additionally, in December 1974 the domestic debt stood at
4,595 million Egyptian pounds. By June 1983 it had risen to
19,179 million pounds [Ref. 9]. In 1982 Egypt's trade balance
(exports less imports) was a negative 3,212 million pounds.
The trade deficit in 1983 is estimated to be at 3,278 million
pounds [Ref. 10]. Worker's remittances have increased from
1,452 million pounds in 1982 to an estimated 2,309 million
pounds in 1983. This was mainly due to the government's con-
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*Government accounts are calculated at the rate of $1=0.70
Egyptian pounds
.
Source: Al-Ahram Al-Igtisadi, pp. 76, 77, 19 November 1984.
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It should be evident that the government of Egypt, re-
gardless of who occupi.es the top governmental position, is in
dire need of large external injections of financial aid. This
picture shall not change much unless the policymakers are
willing and able to make the difficult and unpopular choices
in its yearly budget. This would require a truly popular and
elected government with broad base support, and a sense of
belonging with a unity of purpose by the populace. Mubarak
had hoped to gain such a mandate by the May Parliamentary
elections, however only one opposition party, the New Wafd,
gained entry with 58 seats out of a total 448 election seats.
His attempt to reduce subsidies in September 1984 in the midst
of a heavy governmental campaign to educate the masses about
subsidies caused some riots in Kafr El-Dawar near Alexandria;
the prices were subsequently reduced [Ref. 11]. Instead
Mubarak and his economic - team have been pushing for increased
productivity and increasing exports [Ref. 12] by aggressive
marketing and improved packaging among other things . The
other side of the coin is to attract foreign investments
[Ref. 13]. The domestically difficult decisions will be de-
ferred to a later period, and so the Egyptian leadership looks
to its external environment for easier decisions.
Egypt receives yearly about one billion dollars in econo-
mic aid from the United States. This has usually been divided
between Economic Support Fund (ESF) , designed for those coun-
tries of strategic importance, and the PL-480 food program.
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The U.S. agency for International Development (USAID). has a
large presence in Cairo as it disburses and manages the aid.
Other sources of aid have included Western European countries
and Japan but not on the same scale as the U.S. inputs or
presence. International organizations such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also pro-
vided needed capital with the former providing since 1970
about $3.8 billion in loans [Ref . 14]
.
We shall examine the available data on economic trade
between Egypt and the world [Ref. 15] between 1980 and 1983
to compare the last two years of Sadat with the first two
years of Mubarak. This should provide us with a tool to
gauge Egypt's economic and trade relations and if they have
been changed by the new regime. We are not attempting though
to assign Mubarak a western or eastern orientation in foreign
policy by the trade patterns but only to evaluate them with-
in our original question of continuity or change with pre-
vious policy.
In 1980 Egypt's volume of bilateral trade with the Soviet
Union was $204.5 million and $362.2 million in 1981, accord-
ing to IMF data. The volume in 1983 and 1983 under Mubarak
were $311.0 million and $308.2 million, respectively. When
Eastern Europe is added (to include Romania, Hungary and
Yugoslavia) the figures for 1980 and 1981 become $956.9
million and $1,312.4 million, respectively. Under Mubarak,
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the volume of trade then becomes $1,343.4 million and $1,319.8
million for 19.82 and 1983, respectively. iRef. 15: p. 151]
As a percentage of Egypt's exports and imports during
those same four years we will actually notice a decline in
eastern block nation's trading share with Egypt. On the ex-
port side in 1980 the share was 13.6% and 10.5% in 1981.
This increased to 14.9% in 1982 and back down to 11.2% in
1983. With regards to imports, the percentages become 11.1,
10.8, 9.7, and 6.1 for the successive years, showing a con-
tinuing decline. Of interest is how prominent Romania and
Yugoslavia figure as trading partners with Egypt before and
after Sadat's assassination. Between 1980 and 1983, the
volume of bilateral trade with Romania was actually larger
than with the Soviet Union. [Ref. 15 :p. 151]
If the Soviet Union and eastern bloc nations capture this
small share of Egypt's trade, then with whom is the bulk of
the remaining trade conducted. The bloc of industrialized
countries including the U.S., Canada, Western Europe and
Japan capture most of Egypt's trade. In 1980 and 1981 average
share of exports to that bloc was 55.7% with the average im-
port share being 70.6%. The succeeding years of 1982 and
1983 the average exports figure was 62.9% while imports
stood at 75%. So we note- how these industrialized countries
have increased their share of Egypt's trade under Mubarak's
presidency. [Ref. 15:p. 151]
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Let us now shift to some of the economic decisions
undertaken in the past three years and how they impacted on
Egypt's relations with the superpowers and their respective
blocs. Two months after assuming power, Mubarak, lifted a
ban on Egyptian cotton exports to the eastern bloc imposed
by Sadat a few weeks before his assassination [Ref . 16]
.
This was one of the first indications that the new Egyptian
leadership wished to separate economic policies from inter-
national politics of which Kamal Hassan Ali is a strong ad-
vocate. A similar decision in March of 19.82 was the approval
to buy newsprint from the Soviet Union and East Germany,
these imports had been frozen in 1981. Additionally, Mubarak
had earlier requested from the Soviet Union the return of
some 66 industrial advisors to maintain some of the Soviet-
supplied factories under warranty in Egypt.
Relations with the Soviet Union improved further with
the signing on 26 May 1983 of the first bilateral trade
agreement since 1977. This agreement made arrangements for
repayment of Egyptian debts owed to the Soviet Union which
were stopped by presidential decree. Egypt's exports will
be approximately 35 million Egyptian pounds over the amount
it imports from the Soviet Union, this differential will be
considered installments toward full debt repayment. Up to
this point there had been disputes between the Egyptian and
the Soviet governments over the amount of debt and the level
of yearly installments to be paid. [Ref. 17]
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A second trade protocal was signed in Cairo on 1 December
1983 by visiting Soviet deputy foreign trade minister, Ivan
Grishin. This new trade protocal for 1984 aimed at increas-
ing the volume of trade exchange between the two countries by
25% to an estimated 500 million Egyptian pounds. As a result
of these agreements, the volume of bilateral trade will in-
crease dramatically over the previous years, if they are
carried out in full. ' The Soviet Union will then absorb
about 90% of Egypt's exports of furniture, perfume, and cos-
metics, 80% of its exports of perfume oils, and 50% of its
cotton yarn exports in addition to cloth, citrus, onions,
and garlic [Ref. 18]. Egypt's imports from the Soviet Union
will include 40% of its needs for coal, frozen fish, and
cardboard, and 46% of its wood; in addition to equipment,
machinery and spare parts [Ref. 18].
There has also been a concurrent improved trading environ-
ment with Eastern European states. Many Egyptian economic
experts [Ref. 18 :p. 4-6] regard the U.S. marketplace as too
competitive for Egyptian manufactured goods. The principal
markets for their industrial production, is felt to be, in
the countries of the socialist camp and the Third World.
While not advocating a return to economic trade with only
one bloc, they are emphasizing the need to aggressively seek
markets suitable for Egyptian manufactured goods . It is
widely expected, though not publicly, in Egyptian circles that
the exchange of ambassadors with the Soviet Union will improve
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trade and economic relations between Egypt and the eastern
bloc states. Some reports of expected facilitations in
trade have already circulated [Ref. 19].
Trade with Romania has been strong even under Sadat with
the Romanian President and Sadat being close friends, however
it is developing further under Mubarak. The volume of trade
between Cairo and Bucharest was estimated at $420 million in
mid-1982 by Egyptian sources, and was expected to reach $1
billion by 1985 {Ref. 20]. An economic protocol was signed
with Romania in May 1983. In 1984, Romania agreed to build
a cement factory near Asyut with a 2 million ton capacity
when completed (1986-1987) at a cost of $277 million [Ref.
21]. Electricity projects were also earmarked by Romania
for soft loans [Ref. 22], as were steelworks [Ref. 23], A
tank deal was consummated in January of 1984 with Egypt for
the eventual purchaser, Iraq [Ref. 24].
Czechoslovakia is another country with which Egypt ex-
pects to improve its trade balance. In 1983 Egypt imported
three times as much as it exported to Prague [Ref. 15] . In
late 1982, Egypt was reported to have received some equipment
from Czechoslovakia for its heavy artillery plants; these
were ordered three years earlier [Ref. 25] . The final de-
livery of this equipment indicate the thaw in relations in
the post-Sadat period. An economic and technical cooperation
agreement was signed by both countries on 30 May 1984, with
hope to improve on the $170 million in bilateral trade reached
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in 19.83 [Ref. 26.]. Czechoslovakia had indicated its willing-
ness to join in the development of the Egyptian petrochemical
industry as well as in the energy industry, agriculture, and
textile industry [Ref. 27].
Trade relations with. Hungary have been increasing but
from a lower base. A protocol of economic and trade coopera-
tion was signed early in 1982 [Ref. 28] . It provided for
$50 million in credit facilities to finance 85% of their
joint ventures, to be repaid over six to ten years. The ven-
tures would be in agriculture, irrigation, electricity, and
transportation fields. At the end of 1983, Budapest was to
build 120 train carriages [Ref. 29]. Hungary has been eager
to increase its volume of trade with Egypt as evidenced by a
special 24-page supplement in the Egyptian economic journal
Al-Ahram Al-Igtisadi (19 November 1984) . This also served
to advertise "a week of Hungarian business, technology, and
culture" held in Cairo the end of the year. Earlier in the
year, Mubarak had met with Hungary's agriculture and food
minister Vancsa to obtain more help for farming and land re-
clamation projects [Ref. 30], indicating Egypt's increased
emphasis on the agricultural sector.
The German Democratic Republic has not been prominent in
Egypt's trade patterns. It has provided in 1982, $133 million
for rural electrification and network renewal in 47 towns
[Ref. 31]. Overall relations with Bulgaria have been strain-
ed for several years and it was not until 1984 that any
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improvements, were noted. A Bulgarian trade team arrived in
Cairo to stimulate economic cooperation; a trade agreement
was signed on 20 January 19.84 {Ref. 32]. The Egyptian govern-
ment's trade center in Sofia, which was closed in 1977, was
finally reopened in Septemher of 1984 [Ref. 33],
Between July 1983 and July 1984, according to selected
contracts reported in Middle East Economic Digest [Ref. 2:
pp. 38-44], Egypt signed 144 deals, the eastern bloc states
acquired 11 of these contracts or 7.6%. These numbers will
probably increase in the future as Egypt continues to nor-
malize its relations with these countries in search of ex-
port markets and credit facilities
.
Egypt's economic needs dictate on the leadership to iso-
late economic and trade policies from adverse political re-
percussions. To minimize any adverse conditions, Mubarak
has sought to foster and project a calm and stable domestic
environment and a steady, at times dull, foreign policy lack-
ing the "electric shocks" or "solid blows" of his predecessors
Egypt must continue to maximize its external resources as
long as it continues on the current economic course. It is
estimated that Egypt received $12.68 billion worth of aid
from the U.S. and Socialist countries between 1954-1980 [Ref.
34]. Since then, U.S. economic and military loans and
grants have averaged about $2 billion a year.
Mubarak has embarked on a course to redirect the EODP to
a production orientation to curb excessive consumerism, has
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called for increased productivity and quality in manufacturing
to better Egyptian goods. The Arab world, Africa and the
Socialist countries are projected to be the prime export mar-
kets for its manufactured and semi-finished goods. However,
Egypt's economic links with the west, regardless of the criti-
cism they receive at times in the domestic press [Ref. 35],
are a very real necessity to meet its development goals, and
above all to feed a growing population. The centrality of
the economy in Egypt's policies is reflected by Esmat Abdel
Meguid, the foreign minister, who has elevated his "diplomacy
of development" to become the driving force for his ministry.
It would become an effective way of achieving Egypt's econo-




"World politics are very complex and one should not be
so sensitive about everything .... It is a game of inter-
ests... we should look after our interests even with the
devil." [Ref. 1]
Egypt's geostrategic position, and historical regional
role have conditioned the attitudes and actions of its people
and leaders throughout history. Its large homogeneous popu-
lation has, simultaneously been a strategic asset and an eco-
nomic burden. Successive regimes have now had to deal with
the dilemmas of aid/independence, resources/objectives, and
security/development
.
These regimes operated at different stages of Egyptian
and Third World economic and diplomatic development. The
international system had also undergone some major changes
over the past 35 years. The conditions providing the context
in each stage have been different. Nasser and most Egyptians
in 1952 were preoccupied with gaining British evacuation
following decades of heavy British dependence. For Sadat in
1970 his starting point was a heavy dependence on the Soviet
Union and occupied Egyptian land. Mubarak's starting point
was marked with the violent assassination of Sadat, by his
side, and heavy dependence on the United States. When asked
about whose style and policies he favors, Sadat or Nasser,
Mubarak has always been quick to reply that each had his own
era and situation and his period is different, adding that
his name is Hosni Mubarak.
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Nasser's foreign policy was not fully articulated until
the tumultuous, years of 19.55-56. after a series of tragic mis-
understandings and distrust with the west. Sadat's own poli-
cies and their consequences did not materialize for several
years after he assumed power. Both had reacted to the ex-
igencies and embarked on a series of decisions to correct
the wrongs they perceived, and in a manner each felt would be
popular. Mubarak has been at the helm slightly more than
three years; by then Nasser had been to Bandung and Sadat
had celebrated the Crossing. Mubarak's Bandung or Crossing
are no where on the horizon. Instead, domestically he has
a long neglected economy that is more in need of a blood
transfusion than band-aids, while regionally and internation-
ally he has the elusive comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace and
an achievable leading role in the nonaligned movement.
Mubarak has delivered on the nonaligned movement and
Egypt has regained much of the international stature it had
lost during Sadat's last years. However, domestically this
has only bought him more time until he can provide a real
miracle as his predecessors had done. In Egypt the presi-
dency comes with a very heavy burden, its occupant becomes a
near deity -- a Pharaoh -- and must perform as one. Form had
overtaken substance years ago and a few waves of the leader's




Mubarak, from the beginning, had to distance his regime
from the United States. This was the natural reaction to
Egypt's immediate past experience with the heavy dependence
on the United States. Reassertion of nonaligned principles,
in word and deed, served this well. However, this was tem-
pered by his immediate security needs -- external and inter-
nal, and the services the United States could provide during
the tense few weeks following the assassination.
Concomitantly, passive measures were initiated to mend
fences with the Arab world, specifically Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf states. Also, peace with Israel had to be maintain-
ed in order to regain and keep the Sinai and in order to meet
his formidable internal challenge -- the economy. For these
objectives Mubarak had to maintain Egypt's relationship with
the United States, but with varying degree of closeness, si-
multaneously. Following the invasion of Lebanon in 1982,
Mubarak's balance beam with the United States had become a
tight wire. Egypt's massive economic needs and current poli-
cies make the west in general and the United States in parti-
cular best suited and able to provide the help.
As Egypt attempts to modernize its factories, agriculture,
and inject western technology and equipment into its military
forces, it realizes the benefits that could be accrued from
its relationship with the United States. Arab financial
assistance could not replace the expertise and technology
associated with the current western aid. Therefore, Mubarak
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Mubarak has also removed several politicians which were
prominent under his predecessor and had been targets of
opposition. He has. allowed much criticism of government
policies without taking adverse measures, for he had seen
their eventual effect. With democracy, albeit controlled,
and open dialogue, Mubarak hopes to gain at a minimum the
needed stability for economic growth and eventually the sup-
port for any possible unpopular but needed economic reforms.
Despite Egypt's economic woes, they are probably easier
to deal with and hold a greater certainty for reform than to
find a just and lasting peace to the Palestinian problem --
Mubarak's other Herculian task. Of these two basic issues
facing the regime, the economy is the more dangerous since
it directly affects millions of Egyptians every single day of
their life. There is a dilemma in reforming the economy, for
if subsidies are removed as have been called for by the IMF
and Egyptian economists, then the regime would face riots
similar to or greater than the January 1977 or Kafr El-Dawar
ones. These would reveal the weakness of the regime, some-
thing no ruler wishes to face. Therefore, political consid-
erations negate sound economic application even if it is in
the country's long-term benefit. So until Mubarak or his
successor is forced to or has enough political strength to
undertake these structural reforms in the economy, Egypt will
continue to depend on external aid.
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The United States, looms large in supporting Egypt's econo-
my and hence its regime, and also in finding a solution to the
Palestinian problem. Within the international system, the
only state which has exercisable influence over Israel, the
party on the ground, is the United States. Therefore, it can
serve to provide Mubarak with the means to achieve either or
both of the tasks ahead of him. At the same time, as we men-
tioned earlier, Mubarak had to distance himself from the
actions of the United States. Also when he tried to apply
influence on Israel in Lebanon directly or through the United
States he discovered how little influence he had and/or how
little influence his senior partner could exercise with his
neighbor to the east. In addition, Israel's activity in
Lebanon and the tragedies of September 1982, turned any future
asset Cairo had placed on its ties with Israel to a real
liability
.
Mubarak's reaction was to continue Egypt's return to the
Arab fold but now with much greater emphasis on the political
influence a united Arab strategy would have. The American
ties were to be maintained in order to meet Egypt's economic
and military requirements. The key to solving the Palestinian
problem switches from Washington to the Arab capitals . Mubarak
and the Egyptian leadership see Arab disunity as the reason
for the United States not restraining Israel and enforcing
or seriously backing the autonomy talks and later the Reagan
plan. In other words, the United States will not act on its
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own unless, it is. pressured. In 19.73, it was the October War
that provided that impetus for action, in the 1980s that op-
tion is no longer valid and Egypt does not wish for it to be-
come attractive. Therfore, a peace strategy will be sought
with Amman and a moderate PLO and behind the scene support
from Riyadh, which, was beginning to manifest itself at the
close of 1984. Still the United States has a definite role
to play even in this strategy.
The key here is that Egypt has not actively sought to
distance itself from the United States or recall its ambassa-
dor from Tel Aviv. Egypt has been reacting to events beyond
its control, it is discovering how much its regional influ-
ence had deteriorated since 1973. In order to meet its
national interest, Egypt will continue to nurture strong ties
with the United States while sometimes being openly critical
of its Middle Eastern policy. The only real Egyptian initia-
tive was immediately following Sadat's death with Mubarak
claiming nonaligned policies as a guide to Egypt's foreign
policy. This provided more room to maneuver and theoretically
increasing available policy options for the regime. Despite
this, Mubarak has not taken Egypt for another swing of the
pendulum, he seems to have for now settled in the middle.
He once said his hobby was reading Egyptian history, Mubarak
must have retained some valuable lessons.
Continuity or change? We think that question has been
resolved by the above analysis. With regards to style, the
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two men are diametrically opposed. The conditons. under which
the presidency was assumed demanded some changes be taken.
Subsequent events at the regional level again caused some
shifts. Yet, Egypt continues to maintain a "special" rela-
tionshio with one superpower and normalized relations with
the other, calling it balanced relations. It has made the
use of its facilities by the United States more stringent,
but has not withdrawn the offer. It has withdrawn its am-
bassador from Israel but continues to uphold the peace treaty
It has taken a more active role in the Arab world and is slow-
ly being accepted back. Sadat had not chosen to politically
isolate Egypt from the Arab world, that was imposed on him.
Mubarak later discovered that Egypt was not "great" without
the Arab world, but that both were in need of each other.
If continuity means Egypt and the United States analyze
regional and global developments identically, then the answer
is a profound no. If change means the Soviet Union will have
an exclusive economic or military relationship with Cairo,
then again no. There have been some shifts and adjustments
but nothing drastic had occurred, it simply would not be in
Mubarak's cautious style. Future Egyptian orientation and
foreign policy direction will depend greatly on Mubarak's
domestic position, Israel's regional activity -- in Lebanon
and the occupied territories, progress on the peace process,
and the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in the region.
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